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CRIMINAL CLEAR STATEMENT RULES 
CARISSA BYRNE HESSICK* & JOSEPH E. KENNEDY** 
ABSTRACT 
There is a broad consensus in the criminal justice community that our 
criminal statutes are a mess: They are imprecise, overly broad, and overly 
punitive. Legislatures write these laws because there are significant 
political incentives for them to be “tough on crime” and few incentives for 
them to write carefully crafted laws. The problems of over-criminalization 
thus seem to be both a predictable yet intractable consequence of the 
incentives that legislatures face. But this Article offers a novel solution: 
Judges should develop new clear statement rules to interpret criminal 
statutes. The Supreme Court has created clear statement rules to protect 
important values, such as federalism and the separation of powers. 
Legislatures can overcome those values, but only if they do so affirmatively 
and unambiguously. Just as existing clear statement rules protect important 
structural values, new criminal clear statement rules would protect 
important criminal justice values. Unless statutes clearly state that they 
reject those values, clear statement rules will result in statutory 
interpretations that better protect the interests of criminal defendants. The 
result will be clearer and more thoughtful criminal laws—both because 
legislatures will write better statutes and because judges will construe 
poorly drafted statutes in a more narrow and predictable manner. In 
addition to making the case for criminal clear statement rules as a general 
interpretive tool, this Article proposes two specific clear statement rules. 
One rule would create a default presumption of a knowing mental state 
requirement for material elements. The other would impose a substantial 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is near-universal consensus in the legal community that our 
criminal laws are a mess.1 Our laws are imprecise: they fail to define key 
 
1. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 27–52 (2001); MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE 
LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1–22 (2016); DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE 
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008); JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE 
WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 75–110 
(2007); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 244–81 (2011) 
[hereinafter STUNTZ, COLLAPSE]; MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 
IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE 3–20 (2004); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 41–68 (2003); Stuart P. 
Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of 
Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997); Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law 
Crimes, 105 VA. L. REV. 965, 992–96 (2019); Shon Hopwood, Clarity in Criminal Law, 54 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 695, 702–09 (2017); Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J. 
753, 785–804 (2002); Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law 
Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1327, 1339–48 (2008); Paul H. Robinson & 
Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 
635–44 (2005); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 












terms, and they regularly omit key information, such as what mental state is 
required to trigger the law. Our laws are overly broad: they include conduct 
that seems only marginally related to the problem the legislature claimed to 
have been addressing, and they include seemingly trivial or harmless 
behavior in their sweeping terms. Our laws are also overly punitive: they 
routinely contain harsh sentences that are designed to pressure defendants 
into pleading guilty rather than to delineate appropriate levels of 
punishment. As a result, the United States has the highest incarceration rate 
in the Western world.2 
These criminal laws are the product of legislative dysfunction. Crime is 
exploited for political gain. As others have noted, criminal legislation 
essentially serves as campaign literature for legislators.3 Legislatures 
package unrelated crimes with a similar feature as a “new crime problem” 
and refer to those committing the crimes in sensationalized terms, like 
“superpredators.”4 Legislators rarely mention the fact that the behavior they 
are purporting to address is already criminal and subject to significant 
punishment. What is more, there is no organized lobby against criminal 
legislation.5 As a result, there is little debate or pushback on imprecise, 
overly broad, or overly punitive criminal laws. Instead, legislators line up 
to pass new criminal laws without any shared understanding of what they 
mean, how far they sweep, and how they fit into the existing criminal laws.  
Because of this legislative dysfunction, the meaning of criminal statutes 
often must be resolved in the context of specific cases. In the case of 
imprecise laws, judges are left to determine what that language actually 
means. And in the case of overly broad laws, no one expects the laws to be 
enforced as written. Instead, we rely on prosecutors to use their discretion 
to weed out cases involving only trivial behavior.6 But if a prosecutor 
 
and Criminal Justice Reform, 61 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 1–8) (noting that 
public attitudes towards the criminal justice system are in flux and, as a result, criminal justice reform 
has been adopted in several jurisdictions), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=339180 
0. 
2. Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1713 
(2006). 
3. Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement 
Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 774 (1999). 
4. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modern 
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 870–73 (2000). 
5. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 
1029–30 (2006). 
6. DOUGLAS HUSAK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 368–69 (2010); 
see also William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, 
in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 351, 378 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (“The real law, the ‘rules’ that 
determine who goes to prison and for how long, is not written in code books or case reports. Prosecutors 













exercises her sweeping discretion under these laws in a way that is not 
politically popular, legislators can claim that the result was not what they 
intended.7 And when courts step in to make the hard choices the legislators 
failed to make, the same legislators often complain that judges are 
overstepping their bounds.8 This is a win-win for legislators. They get to 
criticize others for doing the job that they themselves refused to do in the 
first place. Nice work if you can get it. 
Prosecutors and judges bear some of the blame in this dysfunctional 
relationship. In some instances, prosecutors are the reason for poorly drafted 
and overlapping statutes. Prosecutors routinely lobby for new, sweeping 
legislation, even when existing laws would address perceived wrongdoing.9 
And when efforts have been made to reform criminal codes, prosecutors 
have often stood in the way of that reform.10 
Judges also enable this state of affairs. Courts fail to set clear and 
consistent rules about how legislatures should speak to them. Many judges 
say that they will interpret statutes based only on their text, while others say 
they will interpret laws in conformity with the legislature’s purpose for 
enacting them. Under the textualist approach, courts base their interpretive 
decisions on what they believe an ordinary speaker of English would 
understand the text to say. But it is extremely difficult to predict what judges 
will conclude is the ordinary meaning of a statute. Purposivist approaches 
do not fare much better. While legislatures clearly intend to extend the scope 
 
7. See, e.g., Matt Bokor, Prosecutors Have Little Sympathy for Senior Gamblers, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Feb. 4, 1982, LEXIS (reporting that upon learning that prosecutors filed illegal gambling charges 
against eight seniors who were playing a “nickel-and-dime card game,” House Criminal Justice 
Chairman Larry Smith, “while not advocating a change in the statute, said he would hope prosecutors 
would use better judgment”); Michael E. Miller, N.C. Just Prosecuted a Teenage Couple for Making 
Child Porn—of Themselves, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/mor 
ning-mix/wp/2015/09/21/n-c-just-prosecuted-a-teenage-couple-for-making-child-porn-of-themselves 
[https://perma.cc/6XMS-B59Y] (noting that the legislator “who wrote the law . . . said he never intended 
for it to be used against kids in a consensual relationship” even though the text of the statute did not 
include any such limitations); Brendan Sasso & Jennifer Martinez, Lawmakers Slam DOJ Prosecution 
of Swartz as ‘Ridiculous, Absurd,’ HILL (Jan. 15, 2013, 10:52 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology 
/277353-lawmakers-blast-trumped-up-doj-prosecution-of-internet-activist [https://perma.cc/A8BU-2R 
Z9] (reporting that, when charges filed by prosecutors under the notoriously imprecise Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act led to a defendant committing suicide, federal legislators criticized prosecutors’ decision 
to bring charges). 
8. See, e.g., Okla. Lawmakers Move to Change Sodomy Law After Teen Suspect Cleared, FOX 
NEWS (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.foxnews.com/us/okla-lawmakers-move-to-change-sodomy-law-aft 
er-teen-suspect-cleared [https://perma.cc/9M53-FVVB] (quoting state lawmaker who described courts’ 
decision not to read missing language into a criminal statute as a “grave error”). 
9. See, e.g., Josie Duffy Rice, Prosecutors Aren’t Just Enforcing the Law—They’re Making It, 
APPEAL (Apr. 20, 2018), https://theappeal.org/prosecutors-arent-just-enforcing-the-law-they-re-making 
-it-d83e6e59f97a/ [https://perma.cc/3X5M-DKLD].  
10. See Jessica Pishko, Prosecutors Are Banding Together to Prevent Criminal-Justice Reform, 













of existing criminal codes when they enact new criminal legislation, it is 
difficult to determine precisely how far they intended to extend it. And so 
judges routinely invent intent by imagining that legislators considered 
grammar, punctuation, and statutory scheme as they carefully chose each 
word11—a vision so at odds with the fast-paced sausage-making of criminal 
legislating that it would be funny if it were not the source of such serious 
problems. 
Legislative dysfunction is, of course, not limited to criminal law.12 But it 
has a number of particularly harmful effects in this area. It creates too much 
prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors effectively decide the scope of 
imprecise or overbroad laws when charging and plea bargaining.13 Because 
the laws are often also overly punitive, prosecutors have significant leverage 
to secure pleas. Given the drastic potential consequences they face, 
defendants cannot risk the possibility of losing at trial, so they forgo the 
opportunity to have a judge pass on the meaning of the statute in return for 
a favorable plea bargain.14 The result is a system that routinely and 
systematically deprives people of liberty without the safeguards that the 
Constitution supposedly guarantees. 
Imprecise and overly broad criminal laws also place the individual 
members of the public in an impossible position. People must either risk 
criminal liability when engaging in conduct that they reasonably believe 
might be legal, or they must refrain from innocuous or even beneficial 
behavior.15 And for laws that everyone breaks sometimes—such as traffic 
laws—these overly broad laws are rarely enforced in an evenhanded 
manner.16 Law enforcement is more likely to enforce these laws against 
 
11. E.g., United States v. Weisser, 417 F.3d 336, 348 (2d Cir. 2005) (relying on the placement 
of a semi-colon in order to determine whether defendant was subject to a sentencing enhancement). 
12. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1–7 (1982) 
(highlighting the difficulties in revising laws once they are passed and noting the problems associated 
with that difficulty); Michael J. Teter, Letting Congress Vote: Judicial Review of Arbitrary Legislative 
Inaction, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1435, 1441–50 (2014) (discussing the problems associated with legislative 
gridlock). 
13. See Hessick, supra note 1, at 992–96.  
14. The rules of criminal procedure contribute to this dynamic, as they do not provide for the 
same robust motions to dismiss as do the rules of civil procedure. In order to have a judge rule on the 
scope of a statute, criminal defendants are forced to proceed to trial and move for a directed verdict—
but by that point a plea agreement is no longer a viable option. See James M. Burnham, Why Don’t 
Courts Dismiss Indictments?, 18 GREEN BAG 2D 347, 348–51 (2015); James Fallows Tierney, Summary 
Dismissals, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1841, 1852–58 (2010).  
15. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 1152–56 (2016). 
16. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” 












people of color and in poor communities.17 Indeed, racial profiling is made 
easier by the significant discretion that these laws give to police.18 
The legislative dynamics that produce these criminal statutes also 
diminish political accountability. Past accounts of statutory interpretation 
have stressed dialogue between the legislature and the courts.19 But we 
should also conceive of legislation as a dialogue between the legislature and 
the public. Voters will evaluate their representatives based on the laws that 
they pass (or fail to pass). But voters cannot hold legislators politically 
accountable for statutes that voters cannot understand or whose meaning is 
supposed to be determined by other actors—namely prosecutors (and 
perhaps judges). In this sense, the failure to clearly define crimes denies 
criminal defendants—and all voters—their day in the legislature.  
This Article suggests a novel approach that may fundamentally change 
these dynamics: criminal clear statement rules.20 A clear statement rule is a 
particularly strong presumption that a judge uses when interpreting a statute 
to protect certain values or interests. Specifically, clear statement rules 
presume that the legislature did not intend the statute to undermine a value 
or interest unless the legislature has affirmatively and clearly stated its intent 
to do so. Clear statement rules protect the value or interest at issue by 
requiring a particular outcome unless the statute contains explicit and 
unambiguous language to the contrary.  
Although courts have, on occasion, used clear statement rules in criminal 
cases, existing clear statement rules are rarely relevant to the interpretation 
of criminal laws. Existing clear statement rules vindicate non-criminal 
 
17. See, e.g., Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department’s 
“Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813 (2007) 
(finding that people of African American and Hispanic descent were stopped more frequently than 
whites during New York City’s stop-and-frisk initiative); Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing: 
Residents’ Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 129, 143 (2000) (“In middle-class 
areas, policing tends to be reactive (responses to residents’ calls), whereas poor neighborhoods 
experience greater proactive policing (officers initiate contacts and engage in more obtrusive stops of 
people on the streets).” (first citing W. Eugene Groves, Police in the Ghetto, in SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES 
FOR THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 103 (1968); and then citing 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 
(1967))). 
18. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1511–38 
(2007). 
19. See Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (expressing an interest “that Congress 
be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the 
language it adopts”); Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, 
and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 210–18 (2013) (describing and documenting the “dialogic” 
theory of statutory interpretation). 
20. As explained in more detail below, we are advocating for what some have called “super-
strong clear statement rules,” see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional 













values, such as federalism or separation of powers, and most criminal 
statutes do not implicate those values. Our proposal expands the universe of 
clear statement rules to vindicate values that are necessary to a fair and just 
criminal justice system.21  
Criminal clear statement rules have a number of benefits. They would 
make it easier for citizens to understand the scope of what is being 
prohibited. They would make it more likely that legislators actually 
deliberate about the scope of the crime being created. And they would make 
legislators more politically accountable for their decisions.  
Clear statement rules would also make it more politically palatable for 
judges to constrain legislatures. That is because clear statement rules do not 
require judges to take sides between the individual rights of criminal 
defendants and public safety. Rather, they require legislators to strike that 
balance and to speak clearly and affirmatively about which balance they 
struck. Absent such a clear statement, judges can legitimately say that the 
legislature failed to criminalize certain conduct because the legislature did 
not use the words required by the clear statement rule to make that choice 
clear. In this way, the use of clear statement rules protects judges against 
the politically loaded charge of judicial activism. 
To be sure, clear statement rules are not content-neutral. They effectively 
constitute default settings that privilege certain outcomes. This privileging 
of outcomes entails substantive choices that require justification. We show 
how this can be done by proposing two specific clear statement rules to be 
applied in the absence of a clear statutory language to the contrary: (1) that 
the mental state for all elements in a felony statute be knowing, and (2) that 
a defendant must have intended or caused substantial harm in order to be 
liable for a felony. These two clear statement rules provide a default setting 
with a clear policy preference: they are specifically designed to act as a 
bulwark against the pathological politics that have shaped criminal law to 
become more punitive in recent decades.  
We readily acknowledge that there are other potential criminal clear 
statement rules that could be formulated and justified. Those other clear 
 
21. While criminal clear statement rules have been proposed before, previous proposals for the 
use of criminal clear statement rules were significantly narrower in scope. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra 
note 1, at 862 (“In cases where defendants are likely to face mandatory imprisonment at sentencing, the 
use of the term willfully in a federal criminal statute shall require the government to prove that the 
defendant knew he was violating a legal duty when performing the acts described by the offense. In 
cases where defendants are likely to face mandatory imprisonment at sentencing, the use of the term 
knowingly shall require the government to prove that the defendant had knowledge with respect to all 
factual elements of the offense charged.”); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of 
Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REV. 1021, 1053 (1999) (“The 
Court will interpret a statute to require the government to prove moral blameworthiness if the Court can 
imagine an extreme hypothetical in which the government’s interpretation would reach action that is not 











statement rules need not be as provocative or as sweeping as the ones we 
propose here. Indeed, the core contribution of this Article is that clear 
statement rules can—and should—be used to vindicate criminal law values. 
Although we believe that the two specific clear statement rules we propose 
would make criminal justice fairer and more efficient, one could reject or 
modify these specific rules and yet accept our primary argument—that 
courts should adopt criminal clear statement rules on the grounds that clear 
statement rules can help ameliorate the dysfunction that plagues criminal 
legislation. 
Criminal clear statement rules will require legislators to say what they 
mean and mean what they say when defining criminal liability. If 
consistently deployed, they will have both short-term and long-term 
benefits. In the short term, they will give society more notice about what is 
prohibited, provide legislators a clearer idea about how to express 
themselves, and modestly decrease prosecutorial discretion over the 
substance of criminal laws. In the long term, they will restore a measure of 
accountability to a legislative process by forcing legislators to internalize 
the political costs of the decisions they make. This, in turn, might lead 
legislators to deliberate more carefully about the crimes they create. 
Criminal clear statement rules will also help to safeguard the legitimacy of 
the courts at a time when the legitimacy of the justice system is under attack. 
Finally, the specific rules we propose would protect criminal defendants 
from thoughtlessly punitive penal statutes. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes legislative 
dysfunction in the area of criminal law and explains how existing doctrines 
have failed to deal with imprecise, overly broad, and overly punitive laws. 
Part II makes the affirmative case for criminal clear statement rules. It 
begins by describing the role that clear statement rules currently play in 
statutory interpretation. It then explains how to expand clear statement rules 
to vindicate criminal law values, as well as how adopting criminal clear 
statement rules could ameliorate legislative dysfunction. In particular, it 
argues for the adoption of criminal clear statement rules that are grounded 
in history, longstanding practices, and constitutional or quasi-constitutional 
principles. Part III proposes our two specific clear statement rules—one 
requiring a knowing mens rea, and the other requiring substantial harm. 
I. DYSFUNCTION IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
Criminal legislation is deeply dysfunctional. Legislators engage in a 
“bidding war” to see who can strike the most punitive tone in response to 
public reports about crime. There are essentially no countervailing forces to 











the routine enactment of crime laws that are imprecisely drafted, overly 
broad, and overly punitive. 
Current doctrine is ineffective at addressing these problems. Neither the 
rule of lenity nor the void-for-vagueness doctrine have provided a 
meaningful check against imprecise or overly broad laws. The overbreadth 
doctrine, despite its name, plays only a small role in policing overly broad 
laws. And outside of the death penalty and life-without-parole sentences for 
juveniles, the courts will not police excessively punitive sentences. 
A. Legislative Dysfunction 
A wide and deep scholarly consensus exists that criminal legislation has 
been dysfunctional for many years.22 This is true at both the federal and state 
level. Legislatures pass penal laws that are severe and sweeping in scope. 
Neither the public nor the other branches of government push back. The 
cycle repeats itself again when some new crime captures the public’s 
attention.  
The eagerness of legislatures to write new criminal laws has resulted in 
an explosion of criminal statutes. One study of federal legislation calculated 
that, between 2000 and 2007, Congress enacted an average of fifty-six new 
crimes each year.23 Another calculated that criminal statutes were enacted 
at a rate that was 45 percent higher than all other types of legislation.24  
This explosion has many causes. Victoria Nourse has described crime 
legislation as driven by a cyclical series of “wars on crime.”25 Sara Sun 
Beale has emphasized the role the media plays in distorting legislative 
politics.26 And many have emphasized the sensitivity of legislators to moral 
panics about crime over the last few decades.27 As Michael Tonry 
explained: 
Something or someone emerges who dramatically threatens 
 
22. See supra note 1 (collecting sources). 
23. John S. Baker, Jr., Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes 1 (Heritage Found. 
Memo No. 26, 2008), https://www.heritage.org/report/revisiting-the-explosive-growth-federal-crimes.  
24. BRIAN W. WALSH & TIFFANY M. JOSLYN, HERITAGE FOUND., WITHOUT INTENT: HOW 
CONGRESS IS ERODING THE CRIMINAL INTENT REQUIREMENT IN FEDERAL LAW 13 (2010), https://www. 
heritage.org/crime-and-justice/report/without-intent-how-congress-eroding-the-criminal-intent-require 
ment. 
25. V. F. Nourse, Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness, 39 TULSA L. REV. 925, 
925 (2004). 
26. Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and 
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 23, 44–51 (1997); see also HUSAK, supra note 1, at 16 (“Tabloids and the popular media thrive on 
accounts of how offenders ‘get away’ with crime by escaping through loopholes and technicalities.”). 
27. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 868–76; see also JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: HOW WE 












established values and interests, the media and state agencies 
overreact and exaggerate the nature and scale of the threat, public 
opinion becomes polarized and demands decisive government 
responses, public officials adopt extreme policies, and no one has 
very much patience for suggestions that the problem is less serious or 
more complicated than it looks.28 
When legislators are responding to the outrage of the moment, they often 
enact new legislation even though existing laws had already criminalized 
the conduct and punished it with substantial penalties.29 The new legislation 
does not have to be effective; it just has to strike the right chord with the 
public’s anxieties of the moment.30 Such legislation satisfies symbolic 
needs, not real ones. As a result, it is often poorly drafted and ill-considered.  
Poor drafting results in imprecise or overly broad laws. Some laws fail 
to define key terms31 or to clearly specify the required mental state.32 Others 
are drafted so broadly that they include behavior that is blameless and 
harmless.33 Once enacted, these laws are rarely repealed,34 even when their 
extraordinary breadth becomes apparent.35 
There are understandable reasons why legislators might write imprecise 
or overly broad laws: “Carefully crafted laws require significant time and 
effort, and both are often in short supply when legislatures are in session.”36 
Precise laws also create a risk that would-be wrongdoers will circumvent 
them.37 But investing this time and effort to strike the appropriate balance 
 
28. TONRY, supra note 1, at 88. 
29. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 966 (2009) (“Legislators gain political credit for responding to the crime du 
jour with a new crime or an increased penalty, even if the new crime is redundant.”); Robinson & Cahill, 
supra note 1, at 635 (documenting that, over four decades, Illinois added “hundreds of new offenses, 
many of which cover the same conduct as previous offenses (and, in some cases, provide for conflicting 
levels of punishment)”). 
30. TONRY, supra note 1, at 44 (“The inherently expressive character of much crime control 
policy distinguishes it from other policy subjects.”). 
31. See Hessick, supra note 1, at 987–91 (collecting examples). 
32. WALSH & JOSLYN, supra note 24, at 13.  
33. See Richman, supra note 3, at 761 (“Although the absolute or relative degree of breadth is 
quite difficult to prove, let alone quantify, anyone with more than a passing familiarity with federal 
criminal law is struck by the extraordinary extent to which Congress has eschewed legislative specificity 
in this highly sensitive area.”). 
34. Myers, supra note 1, at 1337–39 (explaining why criminal laws are rarely repealed, even 
when they no longer reflect public opinion). 
35. E.g., Bokor, supra note 7 (reporting that, when a broad statute was used to prosecute marginal 
behavior, a lawmaker responded that he wished prosecutors would use better judgment, but that he was 
not advocating for a change to the law itself). 
36. Hessick, supra note 1, at 993. 
37. See generally Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008) 
(arguing that overly broad laws may, in some circumstances, be beneficial because they allow the state 












between catching wrongdoers and protecting the innocent is precisely the 
job that legislators are supposed to do.  
Importantly, there is no real political pressure on legislatures to write 
carefully crafted laws. Legislative response to crime need not take account 
of competing interests because the politics of crime are asymmetrical.38 
Crime does not invite compromise and horse-trading because the issue is 
framed in terms of good and evil, and no one likes to be seen as negotiating 
in favor of evil.39 The interests of would be criminal defendants are routinely 
neglected in legislative politics because no interest group represents them. 
As Bill Stuntz explained:  
In other fields, legislation is about tradeoffs and compromises. When 
writing and enacting criminal prohibitions, legislators usually ignore 
tradeoffs and rarely need to compromise. Save for law enforcement 
lobbies, few organized, well-funded interest groups take an interest 
in criminal statutes; criminal defendants’ interests nearly always go 
unpresented in legislative hallways. Legislators thus have little 
reason to focus carefully on the consequences of the prohibitions they 
write.40 
As a result, “both major parties have participated in a kind of bidding war 
to see who can appropriate the label ‘tough on crime.’”41 
Finally, there is a cognitive and rhetorical bias that has distorted the 
legislative process for decades. For a variety of sociological, cultural, and 
psychological reasons, crime and criminal offenders are conceived of, in the 
abstract, in the worst possible terms. Drug dealers, burglars, and those 
committing violent crimes are imagined to be monstrous offenders who are 
 
38. See Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O’Neill, Delegating Punitive Power: The Political 
Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline Formation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1973, 1980 (2006) 
(explaining that, with the exception of those who care about white collar crime, “the groups that seek 
shorter sentences and more flexible sentencing authority do not wield much political power”); Barkow, 
supra note 5, at 1029–31 (contrasting the powerful lobbies for expansive and punitive criminal laws 
with the weak groups that would oppose them). But cf. Richman, supra note 3, at 774–76 (noting that 
some criminal laws, such as mail and wire fraud, target politically powerful white-collar individuals, 
and yet “one rarely sees high-profile efforts by interest groups to limit purely criminal statutes” even for 
white-collar crimes). 
39. See Beale, supra note 26, at 41–43 (recounting that Democrats “realized in the 1990s that 
their traditional support of more liberal crime policies had become a major political liability” and 
describing how “Democratic Congressional leaders deliberately adopted a strategy of taking the crime 
issue away from the Republicans”); Theodore Caplow & Jonathan Simon, Understanding Prison Policy 
and Population Trends, in PRISONS 63, 71 (Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia eds., 1999). 
40. STUNTZ, COLLAPSE, supra note 1, at 173. 
41. Stuntz, Pathological, supra note 1, at 509; see also HUSAK, supra note 1, at 15 (noting that 













dangerous, remorseless, and irredeemable.42 Serious crimes are defined in 
sweeping terms in part to ensure that these monsters do not escape 
punishment through some failure of proof. It is not that voters support 
criminalization and punishment of trivial behavior. It is that they worry 
prosecutors will be unable to find the evidence needed to prove that these 
bad people did other, truly bad things.43 The result is a dysfunctional case 
of bait-and-switch in which an enraged and fearful public support criminal 
laws whose scope includes lesser offenders in addition to the monsters that 
are the staple of legislative debate.44 Often lost in this dysfunctional game 
is any guarantee that the offender intended or even contemplated the serious 
harm that motivated the passage of the crime statute in the first place.45 
This bias not only affects the drafting of the laws, but also the level of 
punishment they impose. Criminal statutes increasingly contain harsher 
sentences in the form of mandatory minimums and higher statutory 
maximums.46 Since the 1970s, the percentage of defendants convicted of 
 
42. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 829–33, 858–76; see also BEST, supra note 27, at 24–26; PHILIP 
JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN AMERICA 4–19 
(1998). For example, most “drug dealers” are relatively minor offenders. Joseph E. Kennedy et al., 
Sharks and Minnows in the War on Drugs: A Study of Quantity, Race and Drug Type in Drug Arrests, 
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 729, 767–73 (2018). 
43. See Stuntz, Pathological, supra note 1, at 519 (noting that when an element of a crime is 
difficult to prove, legislatures can write a new statute that omits that element, leaving it to prosecutors 
to decide when that element is present or not; the legislature is not so much redefining criminal 
conduct—the real crime remains the same—but rather making it easier for the prosecutor to obtain a 
conviction by removing the element as a formal matter). 
Perhaps nowhere is this phenomenon more pronounced than in the case of child pornography cases. 
In recent decades, Congress and state legislatures have dramatically increased the sentences for 
possession of child pornography. These sentences have been increased not because lawmakers and 
voters think that possession deserves this punishment, but rather because they have assumed that anyone 
who possesses child pornography either has or will physically molest a child. See generally Carissa 
Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 853 
(2011). In other words, they have adjusted the punishment for one crime so that it captures the harm and 
seriousness of another crime. And, although the evidence is far from uncontested, it appears that many 
people who possess child pornography do not pose an actual threat to children. See Melissa Hamilton, 
The Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net-Widening Effect, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1694–1714 
(2012). 
44. Kennedy, supra note 4, at 829–33, 858–76; see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON 
HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 19 (1999); Stephanos Bibas, 
Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 929 (2006).  
45. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 44, at 20. 
46. As Darryl Brown has explained: 
[S]tates concluded harsh sentencing policies were successful elsewhere, and they feared being 
a lower-sentence jurisdiction to whom harsh-sentencing states might push their criminals. The 
competitive dynamic set up a cycle of states competing with each for 
ever-harsher criminalization, enforcement, and punishment policies, which seems to have 
leveled off—after exceeding the incarceration rates of all other democracies—only due to the 
substantial strain that high incarceration rates put on state budgets. 
Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics and a 












felonies who were sentenced to incarceration, rather than probation, 
tripled.47 And sentence lengths have increased significantly.48 In short, we 
are putting far more people in prison, and for much longer periods of time. 
The executive branch has encouraged rather than checked this legislative 
dysfunction. As Bill Stuntz has explained, the “pathological politics” of 
criminal law result in legislators and prosecutors cooperating to endlessly 
expand the criminal law: 
[T]he story of American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation 
between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom benefits from 
more and broader crimes, and growing marginalization of judges, 
who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather than 
broader ones. . . . Prosecutors are better off when criminal law is 
broad than when it is narrow. Legislators are better off when 
prosecutors are better off. The potential for alliance is strong, and 
obvious. . . .  
 . . . A deeper politics, a politics of institutional competition and 
cooperation, always pushes toward broader liability rules, and toward 
harsher sentences as well.49 
Cooperation with prosecutors also insulates legislatures against voter 
backlash. One might expect that the prosecution of individuals for 
innocuous behavior under broadly written laws would provoke a response 
by voters, but legislators can easily frame such a prosecution as a failure of 
prosecutorial discretion.50 They can claim that this sort of prosecution is not 
what they intended when they passed the imprecise or overbroad statute, 
and instead simply reflects poor judgment on the part of the prosecutor filing 
the charge.51 This evasion works, in part, because it is usually not clear to 
anyone what the law meant in the first place. It is hard to hold legislators 
accountable for the application of a law that no one understands. Thus, 
legislators evade political responsibility for their decisions about the content 




47. Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission Ought to Be Doing: Reducing Mass 
Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 295 (2013). 
48. Id.; see also Barkow, supra note 2, at 1713 n.5. 
49. Stuntz, Pathological, supra note 1, at 510. 
50. Id. at 548. 












B. The Courts’ Failure to Address Dysfunction and Its Effects 
One might expect the courts to step in when legislatures write imprecise, 
overly broad, or overly punitive laws. Our Constitution separates power 
between different branches in order to preserve individual liberty,52 and 
imprecise, overly broad, and overly punitive laws present a threat to 
liberty.53 In addition, the text of the Constitution includes a prohibition on 
excessive punishment.54 But there are both procedural and doctrinal reasons 
why the courts have not served as an effective check. 
As a procedural matter, the practice of plea bargaining has made it very 
difficult for defendants to challenge a prosecutor’s interpretation of a broad 
or imprecise statute. In contrast to civil cases, where judges routinely decide 
the scope of statutes in the context of motions to dismiss, judges in criminal 
cases usually refuse to make decisions about the scope of a criminal law at 
the beginning of a criminal case.55 Instead, defendants’ substantive law 
arguments are often addressed only after the jury has returned a verdict. 
Since most cases do not go to trial, judges address the scope of the 
substantive criminal law only in a small number of cases.56 
Plea bargaining limits not only defendants’ ability to challenge 
prosecutors’ interpretation of statutes, but also their ability to challenge 
overly punitive sentences. Prosecutors routinely require defendants to waive 
not only their right to a jury trial, but also many other procedural rights as 
part of the plea bargain.57 Those waived rights often include the right to 
appeal the sentence actually imposed on the defendant.58  
Not only does plea bargaining insulate punitive sentences from review, 
but our punitive sentences also help to drive plea bargaining. Our statutes 
 
52. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223 (2011) (stating that individuals have standing to 
challenge separation of powers violations because the “constitutional structure of our Government . . . 
protects individual liberty”); LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 29–32 
(1965); Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2009); Hessick, supra note 1, at 1014; see also Shima 
Baradaran Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071, 1083–84 (2017) 
(articulating these checks and noting that they have, at times, been underenforced).  
53. Hessick, supra note 15, at 1146–59 (explaining how imprecise and overly broad laws create 
problems of notice and arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement). 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
55. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
56. And, even if the case proceeds to trial, the way that post-trial motions are structured also 
results in opinions that do not clearly articulate the limits of criminal statutes. Russell M. Gold et al., 
Civilizing Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1632–33, 1640–44 (2017).  
57. Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and Constitutional 
Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 92 (2015) (conducting study establishing that “a significant number 
of prosecutors seek waivers of all statutory and constitutional claims regardless of whether such 
violations occurred pre-trial, during the entry of a guilty plea, at the sentencing hearing, or thereafter”). 












authorize harsh punishments—punishments that legislators have conceded 
exist to pressure defendants into pleading guilty and cooperating with 
prosecutors.59 A defendant facing a harsh mandatory minimum, for 
example, can escape that sentence by negotiating a guilty plea to a different 
charge. The consequences of losing at trial are so severe that even innocent 
people have pleaded guilty to serious crimes in order to secure a less severe 
punishment.60 Our plea bargaining system has been highly effective. More 
than 90 percent of convictions are the result of guilty pleas.61  
Even when procedural hurdles have not prevented defendants from 
challenging imprecise, overly broad, and overly punitive laws, those 
challenges have rarely succeeded. That is because existing doctrines are not 
particularly effective at dealing with imprecise, overly broad, and overly 
punitive statutes. Courts have used several doctrinal tools—most notably 
the rule of lenity, the vagueness doctrine, and the overbreadth doctrine—to 
narrow or invalidate certain criminal laws that are imprecise or overly 
broad. But, as explained in more detail below, those tools have limitations 
that keep them from effectively policing imprecise and overly broad laws. 
Similarly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to 
essentially avoid judicial review of harsh sentences of imprisonment. As a 
result, courts have failed to act as a check on overly punitive laws. 
 
59. For example, Senator Chuck Grassley opposed legislation that would have reduced 
mandatory minimum sentences, not because he disagreed with the argument that those sentences were 
disproportionately harsh, but instead because prosecutorial discretion meant that those penalties were 
not actually being imposed in all cases. He noted that: 
[J]ust under half of all drug courier offenders were subject to mandatory minimum sentences, 
but under 10 percent were subject to mandatory minimum sentences at the time of their 
sentencing. 
 There are two main reasons so few of these offenders are actually sentenced to a mandatory 
minimum. The first is they may fall within the safety valve Congress has enacted to prevent 
mandatory minimum sentences from applying to low-level, first-time drug offenders or, 
second, they may have provided substantial assistance to prosecutors in fingering high-level 
offenders in a drug conspiracy. 
 That is an intended goal of current Federal sentencing policy, to put pressure on defendants 
to cooperate in exchange for a lower sentence so evidence against more responsible criminals 
can be attained. As a result, even for drug couriers the average sentence is 39 months. That 
seems to be an appropriate level. 
161 CONG. REC. 2240 (2015) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
60. For a list of more than 2,000 individuals who pleaded guilty and were later exonerated, see 
NAT’L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.asp 
x# [https://perma.cc/TA85-RUW2]. 
61. Murat C. Mungan & Jonathan Klick, Identifying Criminals’ Risk Preferences, 91 IND. L.J. 












1. The Rule of Lenity 
The rule of lenity is generally understood to require judges to construe 
ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of defendants.62 The Supreme Court 
has offered two justifications for the rule: 
First, “a fair warning should be given to the world in language that 
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a 
certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the 
line should be clear.” Second, because of the seriousness of criminal 
penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the 
moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts 
should define criminal activity. This policy embodies “the instinctive 
distaste against men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has 
clearly said they should.”63 
The rule of lenity is one of the oldest rules of statutory interpretation.64 
The rule was previously stated in somewhat different terms—judges were 
instructed to “narrowly construe” criminal statutes.65 Under this original 
formulation, the rule was intended to soften the harsh effects of penal law.66 
As a result, the rule benefitted defendants even when a law was not 
necessarily ambiguous; instead, a judge was “to identify all the plausible 
readings of the statute” and then “select the narrowest interpretation within 
that set of plausible options.”67  
In the hands of modern courts, however, the rule of lenity provides far 
less protection to defendants. Modern courts use the rule of lenity as a tool 
 
62. See Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “rule of lenity” as 
“[t]he judicial doctrine holding that a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out 
multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient 
punishment”). 
63. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348–49 (1971) (citations omitted) (first quoting 
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); and then quoting Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 196, 209 (1967)).  
64. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820); Amy Coney Barrett, 
Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 128 (2010); see also Lawrence M. Solan, 
Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 87–96 (1998) (recounting lenity’s history in 
England and the early United States). 
65. Barrett, supra note 64, at 128–29. 
66. Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 897 
(2004). 
67. Id. at 894, 896. Arguably, the rule of lenity originally operated as a clear statement rule of 
sorts: if the statutory text did not clearly foreclose a more lenient interpretation, then the court would 
construe the statute in that way. But unlike other clear statement rules, the rule of lenity did not identify 
a particular issue that legislatures had to speak clearly about; they just generally had to avoid writing 












of last resort.68 Only if they have exhausted all other interpretive tools 
without deriving an interpretation of the statute will judges use the rule of 
lenity to break the tie between competing interpretations.69 Even when many 
judges have disagreed about the meaning of a particular statute, a court will 
nonetheless say that the statute is not ambiguous and refuse to employ the 
rule of lenity. Consequently, in its current form, the rule of lenity only very 
occasionally serves as a check on imprecise criminal laws.70  
Even though lenity could serve (and on occasion has served) as a check 
on imprecise criminal laws, it cannot address the other consequences of 
criminal lawmaking dysfunction. That is because lenity comes into play 
only when statutes are ambiguous. Thus, lenity would not help the 
defendant who wanted to argue that a statute was written so broadly that it 
included harmless or trivial behavior. She would have to show that the 
statute could be read to exclude her behavior, not merely that it should have 
been written to exclude it.71 Nor can lenity serve as a check on overly 
punitive laws. So long as the scope of a law is clear, the rule of lenity does 
not apply, no matter how harsh the penalty associated with that law. 
In addition to providing no protection against overly broad or overly 
punitive laws, lenity provides very little protection against imprecise laws. 
Lack of precision is a necessary, but not sufficient condition, to trigger the 
rule of lenity. Even a statute that is ambiguous on its face may be construed 
to favor prosecution. That is because the courts look not only to the text of 
the statute, but to all other possible sources of interpretation—including 
legislative history72 and “motivating policies” of the statute73—before 
deciding whether a statute is sufficiently ambiguous for the rule of lenity to 
apply. As Dan Kahan has noted, “[r]anking lenity ‘last’ among interpretive 
conventions all but guarantees its irrelevance.”74 
 
68. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 384–86. 
69. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“[W]e have always reserved lenity 
for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort 
to ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the statute.” (quoting 
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980))); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) 
(stating that a court should rely on lenity only if, “[a]fter ‘seiz[ing] every thing from which aid can be 
derived,’” it is “left with an ambiguous statute” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805))); see also Daniel Ortner, The Merciful Corpus: The Rule of Lenity, 
Ambiguity and Corpus Linguistics, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 106–20 (2016) (tracing the decreasing 
force of lenity in court opinions); Price, supra note 66, at 891 (noting that prevailing doctrine “ranks 
lenity dead last in the interpretive hierarchy”). 
70. Price, supra note 66, at 891 (“Lenity comes into play only in the unlikely event that other 
conventions yield an interpretive ‘tie.’”). 
71. See Solan, supra note 64, at 79 (making this distinction). 
72. See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 500 n.19 (1984). 
73. Moskal, 498 U.S. at 108 (quoting Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387). 












A number of commenters have argued that we should reinvigorate the 
rule of lenity and return to a system in which statutes that are not entirely 
clear on their face are interpreted in favor of criminal defendants.75 We also 
regret that the rule of lenity has become a shadow of its former self. But we 
do not believe that lenity is likely to make a comeback any time soon. Given 
the current political hostility to “activist” interpretive practices, it is hard to 
imagine judges ignoring legislative history and purpose in order to revive 
an ancient judicial canon.  
Furthermore, the theoretical underpinning of the rule of lenity—that it is 
necessary to ensure that defendants had notice that their conduct was 
illegal—is both unlikely to be persuasive in a particular case, and it is not 
consistent with modern criminal practice. The modern regulatory state 
contains many criminal prohibitions and so the idea that precisely worded 
statutes provide notice is a legal fiction in all but the most formal sense of 
the word.76 Most importantly, lenity requires judges to place a thumb on the 
interpretive scale in favor of criminal defendants simply because they are 
criminal defendants. That is hardly the sort of action that is likely to be 
palatable to judges—especially judges who must stand for reelection.77 
Thus, the prospects for meaningful reform through a reinvigorated rule of 
lenity are poor, and a solution to the legislative dysfunction around criminal 
law making must come from elsewhere. 
2. The Vagueness Doctrine 
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a criminal statute “clearly 
define the conduct it proscribes.”78 While related to lenity on a conceptual 
 
75. See, e.g., Hopwood, supra note 1, at 740–42; Price, supra note 66, at 940–41; see also Solan, 
supra note 64, at 123–28, 134–43 (arguing against modern trends in the states to abolish lenity via 
legislation). But see John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal 
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189 (1985) (arguing that lenity should be replaced by a principle requiring 
courts to interpret statutes to maximize the rule of law); Kahan, supra note 68 (arguing that lenity should 
be abolished). 
76. See Jeffries, supra note 75, at 205–12. 
77. Although federal judges are appointed and enjoy life tenure, the vast majority of state judges 
owe their seats to either direct elections or retention elections. See JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE 
PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA 3 (2012). Indeed, interest groups 
seeking to advance non-criminal law interests have targeted state judges who are opposed to those 
interests in their reelection campaigns by running ads about their defense-friendly rulings. See id. at 1–
3 (collecting recent incidents); Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common 
Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 n.74 (1995) (collecting 
incidents from the 1980s and 1990s). 
78. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 












level,79 vagueness differs in two very important respects. First, the rule of 
lenity leads courts to construe statutes strictly, but the vagueness doctrine 
leads courts to strike down laws.80 Second, while lenity is a rule of statutory 
construction, vagueness is a constitutional doctrine.81 
Vague criminal laws violate the Due Process Clauses.82 Over the years, 
the Supreme Court has found a number of laws to be unconstitutionally 
vague. In Kolender v. Lawson,83 the Court struck down a California statute 
requiring persons who loiter or wander on the streets to provide “credible 
and reliable” identification whenever requested by the police. The Court 
held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to clarify 
what constituted “credible and reliable” identification. In Smith v. Goguen,84 
the Court struck down a Massachusetts statute that criminalized public 
contemptuous treatment of the U.S. flag because it failed to define 
“contemptuous treatment.” More recently, in Johnson v. United States,85 the 
Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a provision of the Armed 
Career Criminal Act that defined a violent felony as, inter alia, a crime that 
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another.”86 
 
79. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997) (describing vagueness and lenity 
as “related manifestations of the fair warning requirement” of the right to due process); HERBERT L. 
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 95 (1968) (describing lenity as a sort of “junior 
version of the vagueness doctrine”); Mila Sohoni, Notice and the New Deal, 62 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1174, 
1176–77 (2013) (describing vagueness and lenity as two “main features of due process notice doctrine”). 
80. Justice Thomas has recently challenged whether this aspect of the vagueness doctrine is 
appropriate. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1243–44 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Johnson 
v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2568 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
81. States can presumably abrogate a rule of statutory construction. See Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 
1244 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[L]enity is a tool of statutory construction, which means States can 
abrogate it—and many have. The vagueness doctrine, by contrast, is a rule of constitutional law that 
States cannot alter or abolish.” (citations omitted)). But some courts have persisted in applying the rule 
even when legislatures have abrogated it. See, e.g., State v. Pena, 683 P.2d 744, 748–49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1983) (“A.R.S. § 13-104 abolishes the general rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed; 
nevertheless, where the statute itself is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the rule of lenity 
dictates that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant.”); see also Solan, supra note 64, at 
123–28 (describing similar dynamics in New York and California). 
82. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1224–26 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (tracing the vagueness doctrine’s “due process 
underpinnings”). 
83. 461 U.S. 352 (1983). 
84. 415 U.S. 566 (1974). 
85. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
86. Id. at 2557; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012) (defining a violent felony to 
include state or federal court convictions for any felony that “(i) has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk 












The Supreme Court has offered three reasons why a vague criminal 
statute violates the right to due process.87 First, vague laws give insufficient 
notice to citizens about what conduct is permitted and what conduct is 
prohibited.88 Without such notice, an individual may accidentally engage in 
illegal conduct.89 In order to avoid conviction under vague statutes, citizens 
may be deterred from engaging in lawful behavior out of fear that the 
conduct is actually prohibited.90 So not only are vague statutes a trap for the 
unwary, they may also result in over-deterrence. 
The second rationale for the vagueness prohibition is that vague statutes 
provide “insufficient standards for enforcement.”91 When a statute fails to 
give police and prosecutors a clear indication of what conduct is legal, the 
statute “vests virtually complete discretion in the hands” of law 
enforcement.92 According to the Court, such unfettered discretion may 
result in “arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”93 because it “allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.”94 
The third rationale is that vague statutes delegate too much of the 
legislature’s power to make the law.95 In United States v. Reese, the Court 
stated that it would be dangerous if the legislature were to write a statute 
that “set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders, and leave it to 
the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained, and who 
 
87. E.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03 (2010) (“To satisfy due process, ‘a 
penal statute [must] define the criminal offense [1] with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and [2] in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357)); see also 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (adding excessive delegation as a third 
reason). 
88. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 572 (“The doctrine incorporates notions of fair notice or warning.”). 
89. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108–09 (“[B]ecause we assume that man is free to steer between lawful 
and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable 
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the 
innocent by not providing fair warning.”). 
90. United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963) (“[W]e are concerned with 
the vagueness of the statute ‘on its face’ because such vagueness may in itself deter constitutionally 
protected and socially desirable conduct.”). 
91. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 503 (1982). 
92. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358; see also Goguen, 415 U.S. at 578 (remarking on the “the 
unfettered latitude thereby accorded law enforcement officials and triers of fact” under a vague statute). 
93. Goguen, 415 U.S. at 573. 
94. Id. at 575. 
95. See Andrew E. Goldsmith, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 
Revisited, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 279, 284–86 (2003) (collecting cases on the delegation issue and noting 
that the separation of powers “stood for decades as the second requirement of vagueness analysis”). 
While the Court has mentioned notice and arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in all of its modern 
vagueness opinions, the delegation issue appears in only some of those opinions. See Sessions v. 
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1248 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court’s precedents have 
occasionally described the vagueness doctrine in terms of nondelegation. But they have not been 












should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for 
the legislative department of the government.”96 In Sessions v. Dimaya, 
Justice Gorsuch underscored the vagueness doctrine’s commitment to 
preserving the separation of powers.97 He emphasized that: 
[L]egislators may not “abdicate their responsibilities for setting the 
standards of the criminal law,” by leaving to judges the power to 
decide “the various crimes includable in [a] vague phrase” . . . . Nor 
is the worry only that vague laws risk allowing judges to assume 
legislative power. Vague laws also threaten to transfer legislative 
power to police and prosecutors, leaving to them the job of shaping a 
vague statute’s contours through their enforcement decisions.98 
Although the vagueness doctrine seems ready-made to limit imprecise 
laws, the courts have failed to develop a clear standard for what constitutes 
an impermissibly vague law.99 As Justice Frankfurter famously observed, 
the standard for determining whether a statute is unconstitutionally 
imprecise is, itself, imprecise.100 That has led to what appear to be 
inconsistent applications of the standard.  
For example, in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co. the Court struck 
down a price gouging statute which prohibited any person from “mak[ing] 
any unjust or unreasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with 
any necessaries.”101 The Court reasoned that such an open-ended, 
qualitative standard was unconstitutionally vague because it made the 
legality or illegality of conduct wholly contingent upon whether the 
defendant’s conduct was “unjust and unreasonable in the estimation of the 
court and jury.”102 But in Nash v. United States, the Court rejected a similar 
vagueness challenge to the Sherman Act, which has been applied using the 
 
96. 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876); see also United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 92 
(1921) (noting that standardless statutes “delegate legislative power”).  
97. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1227–28 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment).  
98. Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575; and then quoting Jordan v. De 
George, 341 U.S. 223, 242 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). 
99. See Jeffries, supra note 75, at 196 (“The difficulty is that there is no yardstick of 
impermissible indeterminacy.”).  
100. “‘[I]ndefiniteness’ is not a quantitative concept. It is not even a technical concept of definite 
components. It is itself an indefinite concept.” Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). At the time, the Court frequently referred to the concept of vagueness as 
“indefiniteness.” See id. (“This requirement of fair notice that there is a boundary of prohibited conduct 
not to be overstepped is included in the conception of ‘due process of law.’ The legal jargon for such 
failure to give forewarning is to say that the statute is void for ‘indefiniteness.’”). 
101. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 86 (quoting Act of October 22, 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-63, 
§ 2, 41 Stat. 297, 298). 












so-called “rule of reason.”103 Writing for the majority in Nash, Justice 
Holmes stated that “the law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends 
on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some 
matter of degree.”104 Compounding the confusion, in a recent decision, the 
Court reaffirmed both L. Cohen Grocery and Nash despite their apparent 
incompatibility.105  
One assumes that the Justices have been, well, vague about vagueness 
because they understand that precise laws are difficult to write. Language is 
necessarily imprecise.106 Overly precise laws permit would-be criminals to 
circumvent the law.107 And, as the Court observed in Schall v. Martin, the 
law often requires judgment calls, and the factors that are necessary to make 
such judgments “cannot be readily codified.”108 But whatever the reason, 
because the vagueness doctrine has not developed as a predictable standard, 
it is a very limited tool to restrict imprecise laws. 
Even if the courts were to develop a more precise standard for when a 
law is vague, the vagueness doctrine would not be able to solve the problem 
of overly broad or overly punitive laws. The vagueness doctrine prohibits 
only imprecise laws; it does not place limits on precisely worded laws that 
sweep in large amounts of seemingly innocuous conduct or on laws that 
impose harsh punishments. To be sure, the enforcement of overly broad 
laws raises some of the same problems as vague laws.109 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that “the breadth of discretion that our 
country’s legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the 
potential for both individual and institutional abuse.”110 But the Court has 
 
103. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913); see also Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United 
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359–60 (1933) (applying the rule of reason to the Sherman Act); Standard Oil Co. 
of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (same); Note, Potential Restraint of Trade Under the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 2 VA. L. REV. 140, 142 (1914) (describing how the Court “firmly and finally 
established” the “rule of reason” in its antitrust cases). 
104. Nash, 229 U.S. at 377–78. 
105. Compare Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015) (“[W]e have deemed a law 
prohibiting grocers from charging an ‘unjust or unreasonable rate’ void for vagueness—even though 
charging someone a thousand dollars for a pound of sugar would surely be unjust and unreasonable. . . . 
These decisions refute any suggestion that the existence of some obviously risky crimes establishes the 
residual clause’s constitutionality.” (citing L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. at 89)), with id. (“As a 
general matter, we do not doubt the constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative 
standard such as ‘substantial risk’ to real-world conduct; ‘the law is full of instances where a man’s fate 
depends on his estimating rightly . . . some matter of degree.’” (quoting Nash, 229 U.S. at 377)). 
106. E.g., Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282, 286 (1945) (“In most English words and 
phrases there lurk uncertainties.”). 
107. See Buell, supra note 37, at 1507–12. 
108. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278–80 (1984). This may explain why the Supreme Court 
recently indicated that qualitative standards, standing alone, are not enough to render a statute 
unconstitutionally vague. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2561. 
109. See Hessick, supra note 15, at 1152–62 (making this argument in detail). 












limited the vagueness doctrine to statutes that are vague as written, rather 
than as applied.111 
Finally, there may be practical reasons why the Court has not developed 
a robust vagueness doctrine. The remedy for a successful vagueness 
challenge is the invalidation of a statute—a remedy that runs counter to the 
principles of judicial self-restraint.112 As others have explained, courts will 
sometimes narrow the substance of a right in order to avoid awarding a 
substantial remedy.113 Thus, it is possible that the courts have failed to 
develop a robust vagueness doctrine—and will fail to do so in the future—
in order to avoid striking down a large number of statutes. 
3. The Overbreadth Doctrine 
At one point, the Supreme Court appeared poised to place substantive 
limits on the legislature’s ability to enact broad criminal laws—in particular 
laws that swept in blameless everyday activity. Early drafts of Justice 
Douglas’s opinion in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville114 argued that the 
Ninth Amendment’s catchall limitation on government power115 created an 
individual right to walk, stroll, and loaf; and, if such rights existed, then 
laws infringing on such rights were subject to strict scrutiny.116  
But Papachristou was ultimately decided on vagueness grounds, and the 
modern view is that the legislature is (and ought to be) the primary 
decisionmaker about the scope of criminal law.117 Legislatures decide which 
 
111. See Hessick, supra note 15, at 1153–54. 
112. Cf. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2567–70 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (questioning 
the validity of the vagueness doctrine in part based on whether the Constitution gives the courts the 
power “to nullify statutes on that ground”). 
113. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 884–85 (1999). 
114. 405 U.S. 156 (1972). 
115. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”). 
116. Risa L. Goluboff, Essay, Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, 
and What the Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1361, 1365–66, 1376–77 (2010) (describing Draft Opinion, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, No. 
70-5030 (Dec. 28, 1971) (Douglas Papers, Box 1558)).  
117. See, e.g., Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 381 (1989) (noting that “the substantive power to 
define crimes and prescribe punishments” lies with the “legislative branch of government”); Liparota v. 
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is 
entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of 
statute.”); see also Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 594 (1995) (“Our legal culture’s understanding of the link 
between statutory interpretation and democratic theory verges on the canonical and is embodied in the 
principle of ‘legislative supremacy.’”). That is not to say that the legislature is the only decisionmaker. 
Historically, judges were the institution that defined most crimes and defenses. See 1 WAYNE R. 












conduct to criminalize, and there are only modest limits on this legislative 
power. Laws that infringe on the clearly established constitutional rights of 
individuals are prohibited.118 But there is no limit on how much unprotected 
behavior can be criminalized. Consequently, legislatures have been able to 
pass criminal laws that sweep in conduct that is unremarkable or morally 
blameless. The proliferation of such laws is often referred to as 
“overcriminalization.”119  
To be sure, the Court has adopted an overbreadth doctrine, but that 
doctrine is quite limited. The overbreadth doctrine applies only in a small 
number of contexts, such as when criminal laws sweep so broadly as to 
include conduct that is protected by the First Amendment.120 The legislative 
dysfunction described above only rarely results in laws that implicate 
conduct protected by the First Amendment. Thus, the overbreadth doctrine 
is simply not a viable tool to check that dysfunction. 
4. Prohibitions on Excessive Punishment 
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits “excessive bail,” 
“excessive fines,” and “cruel and unusual punishment.”121 Although the 
constitutional text speaks in terms of “cruel and unusual punishment,” rather 
than “excessive punishment,” the courts have read the Amendment to limit 
excessive punishment as well. In particular, the Supreme Court has said that 
 
began as common law for the most part, and only later became primarily statutory”). And judges retain 
at least some of that power today. See Hessick, supra note 1, at 980–87. 
118. Some of the most well-known constitutional law cases were challenges to criminal laws. See, 
e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a state law that criminalized 
interracial marriages); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding it unconstitutional to 
prohibit the dispensation of contraception to married persons despite a state law that imposed a fine and 
at least sixty days imprisonment for using contraception). 
119. Hopwood, supra note 1, at 699 n.24. 
120. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609–10 (2004) (cataloguing the “relatively few 
settings” in which the Court has “relax[ed] familiar requirements of standing, to allow a determination 
that the law would be unconstitutionally applied to different parties and different circumstances from 
those at hand”); Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989) (noting “the general rule that a person 
to whom a statute may be constitutionally applied cannot challenge the statute on the ground that it may 
be unconstitutionally applied to others”); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 
217, 219–20 (1912) (refusing to entertain an overbreadth argument that a statute would be 
unconstitutional if applied in different circumstances not presented by the instant case); see also Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 859–60 (1991) (“Outside the First 
Amendment context . . . . absent a relationship that makes the actual enjoyment of rights by a third party 
dependent on a challenger’s capacity to assert those rights, one party may not escape the application of 
a statute on the ground that it would be unconstitutional as applied to someone else.” (footnote omitted)). 
121. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 












a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment if it is disproportionate to the 
defendant’s crime.122 
Importantly, the Court has adopted different standards of 
disproportionality for different types of punishment.123 The Justices have 
closely monitored whether death penalty sentences are disproportionate.124 
More recently, they have also conducted searching review in cases 
involving life-without-parole sentences for juveniles.125 But for adult 
sentences of incarceration, the Court has all but abdicated its judicial review 
function. The Court has said that an adult’s sentence of incarceration is 
permitted by the Eighth Amendment as long as the government “has a 
reasonable basis for believing” that the sentence “advance[s] the goals of 
[its] criminal justice system in any substantial way.”126 This test is 
essentially low-level rational-basis review.127 
Given the test that the Court has adopted, it is entirely unsurprising that 
it has almost never held an adult sentence of incarceration to be 
unconstitutional.128 Unless and until the Court decides to adopt a different 
doctrinal test, the Eighth Amendment will not serve as a check on overly 
punitive laws.129 
II. CLEAR STATEMENT RULES AS A SOLUTION FOR DYSFUNCTION 
Current doctrine has proven ineffective at addressing the legislative 
dysfunction associated with criminal law. But an existing doctrinal tool—if 
it were extended—could help to ameliorate the dysfunction. In particular, if 
 
122. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (noting the basic “precept of 
justice that punishment for [a] crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense”). 
123. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional 
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1155–62 (2009) (documenting 
how the Supreme Court’s proportionality review is more robust in capital cases than in non-capital 
cases). 
124. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
125. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
126. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (alterations in original) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 
463 U.S. 277, 297 n.22 (1983)).  
127. See Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 
677, 741–42 (2005) (suggesting that the test is akin to rational basis). It is noteworthy that the Court has 
adopted this test because it runs counter to the general principle that claims of individual rights violations 
must be protected by something more than rational basis review. E.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008). 
128. “There has been only a single case in the Court’s history in which a term of incarceration, 
standing alone, was held to be disproportionate to an otherwise validly defined crime.” Barkow, supra 
note 123, at 1160 (referring to Solem v. Helm, in which the Court rejected as unconstitutional a 
mandatory life sentence without the possibility for parole for a defendant who had six prior non-violent 
felonies and who wrote a “no-account” check for $100). 
129. See, e.g., State v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006) (rejecting an Eighth Amendment 












new clear statement rules were adopted to vindicate criminal justice values, 
then legislatures would be forced to speak more clearly and to internalize 
more fully the political costs associated with their decisions to increase the 
scope of criminal law. And, to the extent legislatures failed to speak clearly, 
then courts would interpret criminal laws in a less punitive fashion. 
This Section describes how clear statement rules currently operate and 
explains why courts should develop additional clear statement rules that 
protect important criminal justice values. To be clear, we are not attempting 
to justify, in the abstract, the use of clear statement rules in statutory 
interpretation. For one thing, others have already offered such 
justifications.130 For another, courts routinely use clear statements to 
vindicate other values.131 Indeed, courts have used clear statement rules to 
interpret criminal statutes when those statutes implicate the other, non-
criminal justice values protected by existing clear statement rules.132 Our 
argument is simply that, in light of the fact that we already use clear 
statement rules in the interpretation of statutes, we should adopt additional 
clear statement rules to counteract the legislative dysfunction that plagues 
criminal law. 
A. Clear Statement Rules Generally 
A clear statement rule is a particularly strong presumption that applies 
during statutory interpretation.133 A clear statement rule presumes that a 
statute does not infringe on a particular value unless the legislature has 
affirmatively and clearly stated that it intends to do so.134 There are many 
individual clear statement rules that operate in various areas. For example, 
the Supreme Court has adopted a number of federalism clear statement 
 
130. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 921, 958–59 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000); 
Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 
78 TEX. L. REV. 1549 (2000). 
131. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 
1542–48 (1998) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW (1997)) (documenting a large number of cases decided between 1987 and 1994 in which a 
wide variety of substantive canons, including clear statement rules, were invoked). But see Anita S. 
Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 855–59 (2017) 
(documenting far fewer cases invoking a smaller number of substantive canons during the first six and 
a half terms of the Roberts Court). 
132. E.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 858 (2014). 
133. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 595 n.4 (distinguishing between clear statement rules, 
super-strong clear statement rules, and less strong presumptions in statutory interpretation). 
134. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
399, 401–02 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 












rules.135 Those rules include the rule against congressional waiver of states’ 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court and the rule 
against congressional regulation of core state functions.136 When 
interpreting federal statutes that affect the states, the courts use these 
specific clear statement rules in order to preserve the balance of state and 
federal power. For example, courts will not interpret a statute to subject a 
state to suit in the federal courts unless the statute specifically says so.137 
The term “clear statement rule” has sometimes been used to refer to a 
presumption that can be overcome relatively easily. But we are using the 
term “clear statement rule” to refer to what others have called “super-strong 
clear statement rules”—namely “very strong presumptions of statutory 
meaning that can be rebutted only through unambiguous statutory text 
targeted at the specific problem.”138 Put differently, as we use the term, a 
“clear statement rule” would require a particular outcome unless a statute 
affirmatively and clearly required the opposite result.139 
Clear statement rules have a long history in American jurisprudence. 
Take, for example, the rule against retroactive application of civil 
statutes.140 The Constitution prohibits both Congress and the states from 
passing retroactive criminal laws; but that prohibition does not extend to 
civil laws.141 Nonetheless, courts will not apply a civil statute retroactively 
 
135. Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, in A GUIDE 
TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 55, 74 (John Fitzgerald Duffy & Michael 
Herz eds., 2005); Note, Clear Statement Rules, Federalism, and Congressional Regulation of States, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1959, 1968–73 (1994) [hereinafter Note, Clear Statement Rules]. 
136. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 619–29 (grouping together these clear statement 
rules with others as “federalism canons”). 
137. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 
223, 228 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
138. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 611–12; see also Krishnakumar, supra note 131, at 
835 (contrasting presumptions and clear statement rules). 
139. See Garrett, supra note 135, at 73 (contrasting clear statement rules, which “require a textual 
statement to defeat them,” from “[o]ther canons of construction . . . [that] can be overcome by specific 
evidence in the text or legislative history”); Shapiro, supra note 130, at 940 (stating that “clear statement 
rules are akin to ‘presumptions’ or ‘tie-breakers,’ but go one step further” because they “embody the 
view that the legislature can achieve a particular result only by explicit statement”). 
140. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268–73 (1994). But see Garrett, supra 
note 135, at 73 (stating that the rule against retroactive application of statutes is not a clear statement 
rule, but rather a canon of construction which can be overcome (at least in some cases) by legislative 
history, rather than requiring a statement in the text of legislation). 
141. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting Congress from passing ex post facto laws); id. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting the states from passing ex post facto laws); see Jeffrey Omar Usman, 
Constitutional Constraints on Retroactive Civil Legislation: The Hollow Promises of the Federal 
Constitution and Unrealized Potential of State Constitutions, 14 NEV. L.J. 63, 66–68 (2013) (noting that 
the ex post facto clauses are not textually limited to criminal, as compared to civil laws, but that they 












unless the legislature “made clear its intent.”142 As early as 1806, the 
Supreme Court refused to give retroactive effect to a civil statute that did 
not include “clear, strong, and imperative” language requiring retroactive 
application.143  
Clear statement rules diverge from other contemporary approaches to 
statutory interpretation.144 The two leading schools of statutory 
interpretation are textualism and purposivism.145 Textualism tells judges 
that they must interpret statutes based solely on the words in the statute. It 
also tells them to interpret those words based on how an ordinary or 
reasonable listener would understand them.146 Purposivism, in contrast, 
instructs judges to interpret a statute based on the legislature’s purpose for 
enactment, even if that purpose is not necessarily reflected in the text of the 
statute.147 Clear statement rules do not seek to determine the meaning of a 
statute based on either a hypothetical reasonable listener or the purpose of 
lawmakers. Instead, clear statement rules create a substantive bias in favor 
of a particular interpretive outcome—a bias that can be overcome only if 
the legislature includes an affirmative, unambiguous statement indicating 
that it intended the opposite result. 
Take, for example, the clear statement rule against federal regulation of 
core state functions.148 Although Congress clearly has the authority to 
preempt state policies,149 the courts will presume that federal legislation 
does not preempt state law in areas traditionally regulated by the states 
 
142. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270. There was, in the early days of the Republic, disagreement about 
whether the ex post facto clauses extended to civil statutes as well. See Jane Harris Aiken, Ex Post Facto 
in the Civil Context: Unbridled Punishment, 81 KY. L.J. 323, 327–33 (1992) (collecting sources). But 
the clauses were, even in early cases, interpreted to extend only to criminal cases. See Usman, supra 
note 141, at 66–68. 
143. United States v. Heth, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 399, 413 (1806) (opinion of Paterson, J.). 
144. See Barrett, supra note 64, at 121–25; Note, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 135, at 1959–
60. 
145. See Barrett, supra note 64, at 112; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr, The Meaning of Legal 
“Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1237 
(2015) (“Prominent competing theories of statutory interpretation include textualism, legislative 
intentionalism, and purposivism.”). 
146. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 131, at 17; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent 
in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988). 
147. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1118–26 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 
Foundation Press 1994) (1958). 
148. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 623–25. 
149. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 












unless Congress explicitly says otherwise.150 Thus, in Gregory v. 
Ashcroft,151 the Supreme Court refused to apply the Federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to prevent Missouri from 
requiring its judges to retire by age seventy. The ADEA explicitly included 
the states as employers,152 but it exempted some state officials. The Court 
conceded that a straightforward reading of the statutory exemption did not 
extend it to judges.153 (In other words, the most sensible reading of the 
statute would prohibit Missouri’s mandatory retirement age for judges.) But 
the Court nonetheless upheld the mandatory retirement age for judges, 
stating: “We will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress 
has made it clear that judges are included.”154 
Clear statement rules differ not only from these general approaches to 
statutory interpretation, but also from the specialized doctrines that apply to 
the interpretation of criminal statutes. The rule of lenity—especially the 
modern version—provides an example. Lenity tells judges that they should 
resolve ambiguity in criminal statutes in favor of defendants.155 In that 
respect, one might argue that lenity is a type of clear statement rule: if the 
legislature does not clearly indicate that particular behavior is illegal, then 
the courts will presume that conduct is permitted. Indeed, commenters have 
sometimes grouped together clear statement rules, lenity, and other 
substantive canons of construction in their discussions of statutory 
interpretation.156 But the modern rule of lenity is a tool of last resort; courts 
will employ it only if all other interpretive tools have been exhausted.157 In 
 
150. Michael P. Lee, How Clear is “Clear”?: A Lenient Interpretation of the Gregory v. Ashcroft 
Clear Statement Rule, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 255–56 (1998). 
151. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
152. Id. at 456 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (2012)). 
153. Id. at 466–67 (stating that the language of the statutory exemption “is an odd way for 
Congress to exclude judges”). 
154. Id. at 467. 
155. See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 
808, 812 (1971). 
156. E.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 598–611 (grouping the rule of lenity together 
with traditional clear statement rules and other constitutionally-based presumptions); Sunstein, supra 
note 134, at 471 (characterizing the rule of lenity as one example of “a clear-statement principle in favor 
of the ‘rule of law’: a system in which legal rules exist, are clear rather than vague, do not apply 
retroactively, operate in the world as they do in the books, and do not contradict each other”); see also 
Shapiro, supra note 130, at 925 (rejecting distinctions between so-called linguistic canons, including the 
“much maligned canon that statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed, the 
more sympathetically viewed rule of lenity, the presumption against implied repeal, and virtually all of 
the recently strengthened ‘clear-statement’ rules articulated by the Supreme Court”). 
157. See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (“[W]e have always reserved lenity 
for those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort 
to ‘the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the statute.” (quoting 
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980))); Bass, 404 U.S. at 347 (stating that a court should 












contrast, clear statement rules are a tool of first resort. Courts will employ a 
clear statement rule at the beginning of the interpretive process—the stage 
at which they are deciding on the “plain meaning” of statutory language.158 
The rule of lenity also differs from clear statement rules with respect to 
specificity. Lenity applies whenever a statute is ambiguous. Legislatures are 
unable to anticipate the multitude of factual situations that will arise in the 
future, and thus they cannot always clearly indicate how their statute ought 
to be applied in all of those future situations. In other words, legislatures do 
not know whether the statutory language they choose will later be deemed 
ambiguous. In contrast, clear statement rules identify specific questions of 
statutory construction and tell legislators that courts will interpret those 
questions a particular way unless the statute includes a clear statement to 
the contrary.  
Clear statement rules have been the subject of academic debate.159 While 
some have defended the practice or even called for their expansion,160 others 
have voiced concerns about clear statement rules.161 One major criticism of 
clear statement rules is that they allow the judiciary to intrude on the domain 
of the legislature when they elevate one value above others.162 For example, 
many of the federalism clear statement rules prioritize the ability of states 
to set local policy above the interest of the federal government in promoting 
uniform policy across states.163 The reconciliation of conflicting values, so 
the argument goes, is a matter for the legislature, not the courts.164 And when 
the courts use a clear statement rule to choose between competing values, 
they are arguably acting in a countermajoritarian fashion.165  
Some have responded that this competing values critique is less 
persuasive when the values that the courts choose to elevate through clear 
 
ambiguous statute” (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805))); see also 
Ortner, supra note 69, at 106–20 (tracing the decreasing force of lenity in court opinions); Price, supra 
note 66, at 891 (noting that prevailing doctrine “ranks lenity dead last in the interpretive hierarchy”). 
158. See Garrett, supra note 135, at 74 (“Generally, courts use substantive canons, including the 
clear statement rules, at [Chevron] step one to determine the extent to which statutory meaning is 
clear.”). 
159. See Krishnakumar, supra note 131, at 835–39 (collecting sources). 
160. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 130; Young, supra note 130. 
161. E.g., Barrett, supra note 64; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20; Manning, supra note 134. 
162. In this respect, the arguments against clear statements fall within a broader trope of arguments 
in favor of “judicial minimalism” or “judicial restraint,” in which a court ought to “limit its interpretive 
work to a fairly mechanical retrieval of legislative meaning” and thus “permit majorities to identify and 
evaluate policy choices made by elected officials and to keep such choices uncluttered by judicial 
policymaking that masquerades as interpretation.” Schacter, supra note 117, at 597. 
163. It also sets the policies chosen by states above the particular policies that the federal 
government chooses to promote. 
164. Manning, supra note 134, at 426. 












statement rules are grounded in the Constitution.166 After all, 
countermajoritarianism is necessary when majorities would act contrary to 
the Constitution.167 But, as John Manning has countered, the Constitution 
does not merely enshrine certain principles in abstract terms; instead the text 
of the Constitution itself represents a compromise. So, in Manning’s view, 
efforts to elevate some of the principles behind those compromises through 
clear statement rules is misguided because “the Constitution does not adopt 
values in the abstract.”168 
Despite these criticisms, clear statement rules have proven to be quite 
popular in recent decades.169 And, as we explain below, they are a promising 
means of mitigating legislative dysfunction in criminal lawmaking. 
B. Criminal Clear Statement Rules 
Just as the courts have developed clear statement rules to protect 
important values such as federalism and the separation of powers, so too 
should they adopt clear statement rules to protect important criminal justice 
values. In addition to protecting those values, clear statement rules will 
soften the effects of the legislative dysfunction we described above.170 Clear 
statement rules would force legislatures to speak explicitly and 
unambiguously if they wanted to enact criminal laws that implicate various 
constitutional or common law rights. Otherwise, their statutes will be 
interpreted in a way that is more protective of individual liberty. 
This Section makes the affirmative case for criminal clear statement 
rules. It identifies the many ways in which criminal clear statement rules are 
consistent with the substance and the structure of the Constitution. It 
explains how criminal clear statement rules can provide a counterweight to 
the current punitive dysfunction in the legislatures while maintaining an 
appropriate balance of power between the courts and the legislative branch. 
 
166. Young, supra note 130, at 1591–94. 
167. As Alexander Hamilton noted in the Federalist Papers: 
From a body which had had even a partial agency in passing bad laws we could rarely expect 
a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The same spirit which had 
operated in making them would be too apt to operate in interpreting them; still less could it be 
expected that men who had infringed the Constitution in the character of legislators would be 
disposed to repair the breach in the character of judges. . . .  
 These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States who have committed 
the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of the legislature, but to distinct and 
independent bodies of men. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 483–84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
168.  Manning, supra note 134, at 428–32. 
169. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 619–28. But see Krishnakumar, supra note 131, at 
847–59 (documenting a relatively low number of Roberts Court cases employing clear statement rules). 












It argues that criminal clear statement rules allow judges to interpret statutes 
narrowly while providing political insulation for those decisions. And it also 
gives more detail about how criminal clear statement rules would operate in 
practice. 
1. Identifying Criminal Justice Values 
Because clear statement rules elevate some values over others,171 it is 
important to identify the values that would form the basis of criminal clear 
statement rules. Some have suggested that clear statement rules ought to be 
grounded in the Constitution.172 And courts have often justified clear 
statement rules by explaining how the rule furthers values protected 
elsewhere in the Constitution.173 Ample constitutional text exists to warrant 
clear statement rules in the area of criminal law. But explicit constitutional 
guarantees should not be the only basis for clear statement rules; values 
from the common law or historical practice can also serve as the basis for 
criminal clear statement rules. 
The Constitution clearly values protecting criminal defendants from state 
power, as well as protecting liberty more generally. It contains a number of 
explicit protections for criminal defendants: it secures the writ of habeas 
corpus,174 protects against ex post facto laws,175 secures the right to a trial 
by jury,176 secures the right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures,177 secures the right to a grand jury indictment,178 protects against 
double jeopardy,179 provides for the due process of law,180 secures the right 
to a local and public trial,181 secures the right to confrontation,182 provides 
for the right of compulsory process,183 secures the right to counsel,184 and 
 
171. See supra notes 162–168 and accompanying text. 
172. See Young, supra note 130, at 1591–94; see also Garrett, supra note 135, at 74 (stating that 
clear statement rules “must be justified by convincing reasons rooted in the Constitution or a theory of 
democratic governance”). 
173. E.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (justifying a clear statement rule 
against the retroactive application of civil statutes by reference to “the antiretroactivity principle [which] 
finds expression in several provisions of our Constitution”). 
174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. § 10, cl. 1. 
176. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI. 
177. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
178. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
179. Id. 
180. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 















protects against excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual 
punishment.185 
The Constitution also—both explicitly and through its structure—
protects personal liberty. The Preamble states that the Constitution is meant 
to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”186 The 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights states that the amendments were being added 
because delegates at a number of state conventions adopting the 
Constitution “expressed a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or 
abuse of [the government’s] powers, that further declaratory and restrictive 
clauses should be added.”187 The Ninth Amendment makes clear that the 
enumeration of rights in the Constitution “shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”188 And the major structural 
features of the Constitution—the separation of powers and federalism—
have long been explained as features that protect individual rights.189 
To be sure, the Constitution also creates some affirmative power for the 
government in criminal prosecutions,190 and Article I plainly contemplates 
that Congress will use its powers to create criminal laws.191 But that 
affirmative power is far more circumscribed than the protections that it 
affords to individuals. For example, the Constitution assigns to Congress the 
“Power to declare the Punishment of Treason,” but it also places limitations 
on what that punishment can be, gives an exclusive definition for the crime 
of treason, and sets a floor for what type of evidence is necessary to establish 
the crime of treason.192 In short, it is impossible to read the text of the 
Constitution and not be left with the distinct impression that those who 
wrote and ratified it did so, in significant part, in order to protect individuals 
from government power, in general, and to protect those individuals accused 
and convicted of crimes, in particular. Thus, an ample constitutional 
foundation exists for the adoption of clear statement rules to regulate the 
legislative definition of criminal liability.  
 
185. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
186. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
187. U.S. CONST. pmbl. bill of rights, reprinted in CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, POCKET EDITION 20, 20 (2007).  
188. U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
189. E.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 181 (1992); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513 
(1991); Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE 
L.J. 1672, 1677 (2012); Rhett B. Larson, Interstitial Federalism, 62 UCLA L. REV. 908, 922 (2015). 
190. For example, it creates the power of extradition, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
191. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (granting Congress the power to “provide for the 
Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States”). 












Importantly, the repeated and cumulative protection of criminal 
defendants in the Constitution suggests that Manning’s Constitution-as-
compromise critique of clear statement rules applies with far less force to 
criminal clear statement rules.193 Manning articulated his critique in 
response to clear statements designed to protect the separation of powers 
and federalism—areas in which the Constitution is more equivocal. It is 
clear, for example, that the Constitution does not whole-heartedly embrace 
separated powers.194 Indeed, it includes multiple instances in which a branch 
is assigned a power ordinarily reserved for another, such as the power of the 
Vice President to break congressional ties in the Senate,195 and the 
requirement that the President seek the advice and consent of the Senate for 
treaties and the appointment of executive officers.196 Nor does the 
Constitution reliably elevate the interests of the states over the federal 
government.197 To the contrary, as the Supremacy Clause demonstrates, the 
Constitution also explicitly favors federal interests above states’ interests.198 
Thus, Manning may well be correct that the Constitution represents a 
compromise when it comes to issues of separation of powers and federalism. 
But the Constitution does not express similar ambivalence about individual 
liberty or the rights of criminal defendants. To the contrary, the document 
overwhelmingly seeks to protect liberty and criminal defendants. Courts 
should, thus, construe statutes “in the direction of constitutional policy.”199 
That the Constitution clearly embodies values of individual liberty and 
the protection of criminal defendants from state power is not the only reason 
to adopt criminal clear statement rules. As others have noted, many of the 
existing clear statement rules “protect structural or institutional 
constitutional norms.”200 We are often told that structural and institutional 
rights, such as federalism and the separation of powers, are important 
because they protect individual liberty from government power.201 If the 
courts are using clear statement rules to protect structural rights because 
those structural rights indirectly provide protection to individual liberty, 
then it should be entirely uncontroversial to use clear statement rules to 
protect liberty directly.  
 
193. Manning, supra note 134, at 428–32; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
194. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[T]he Framers did not 
require—and indeed rejected—the notion that the three Branches must be entirely separate and 
distinct.”).  
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
196. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
197. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 432 (1819) (stating that “the 
American people . . . did not design to make their government dependent on the States”). 
198. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
199. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944). 
200. Garrett, supra note 135, at 74. 











Of course, to say that the Constitution embodies values of individual 
liberty does not tell us how to operationalize those values and principles in 
clear statement rules. A general clear statement rule to protect individual 
liberty would not be meaningfully different than the rule of lenity—at least 
the rule of lenity as it was originally formulated and employed. Instead, 
criminal clear statement rules must identify particular issues about which 
legislatures must speak clearly. This is no different than the current clear 
statement rules that protect federalism and the separation of powers. There 
is no general federalism clear statement rule, but rather a series of specific 
rules, such as the rule against congressional waiver of states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, and the rule against 
congressional regulation of core state functions.202 When interpreting 
federal statutes that affect the states, courts use these specific clear statement 
rules in order to preserve the balance of state and federal power. 
Specific criminal clear statement rules could be derived from a number 
of sources. They could be derived from explicit constitutional guarantees. 
Of course, courts must already protect the values embodied in explicit 
constitutional guarantees: if a statute runs afoul of the text of the 
Constitution (or the courts’ doctrine interpreting that text), then courts will 
strike down the legislation. Constitutionally-derived clear statement rules 
would sweep more broadly than the text or the doctrine. They would protect 
a broader class of individuals or a broader course of conduct than what the 
Constitution explicitly protects. That is to say, criminal clear statement rules 
would create a zone-of-interest around various constitutional rights,203 and 
they would require legislators to speak clearly if they intend to encroach on 
that zone-of-interest.204 
For example, the courts could create a clear statement rule that protects 
juveniles from harsh penalties based on the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. Current Eighth Amendment 
doctrine shields persons under eighteen from capital punishment and from 
 
202. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (requiring a clear statement authorizing 
congressional regulation of core state functions); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 
(1985) (requiring a clear congressional waiver of states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit). 
203. Anthony Amsterdam has suggested that the Court has used the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
to create zones of interest around certain individual rights during certain periods of time. Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75–
80 (1960). 
204. To be clear, we are not advocating for an expansion of constitutional rights themselves. Clear 
statement rules are different than, say, penumbras. See Young, supra note 130, at 1591–93 
(distinguishing substantive canons from penumbras). Clear statement rules do not expand the reach of 
the Constitution. While they make it more difficult for legislatures to act on issues that come close to, 













life-without-parole sentences in some circumstances.205 A clear statement 
rule could extend that constitutional protection by making mandatory 
minimum penalties inapplicable to defendants under the age of eighteen, 
unless the legislature clearly states otherwise. In its Eighth Amendment 
cases, the Supreme Court noted that harsh penalties often apply to 
individuals under the age of eighteen only because of how statutory schemes 
have been drafted, not because legislators specifically decided to subject 
minors to those penalties.206 The hypothetical clear statement rule would 
require legislatures to specifically state that mandatory minimum penalties 
apply to those under eighteen, even if those defendants are being tried as 
adults. 
Importantly, the individual rights enshrined in the text of the Constitution 
should not be the only basis for criminal clear statement rules.207 In creating 
federalism clear statement rules and separation of powers clear statement 
rules, the courts have not limited themselves to the text of the Constitution. 
They have also looked to tradition and historical practice. For example, the 
Court has developed a presumption against divesting the judiciary of its 
traditional equity power.208 This presumption was not derived from specific 
text in the Constitution, but rather from practice and the vague reference to 
“judicial power” in Article III.209 
The language in the Due Process Clause similarly supports the use of the 
common law and historical practice as bases for clear statement rules. The 
Due Process Clause is understood to protect “principle[s] of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.”210 Common-law-based clear statement rules can also be 
based on the long tradition of construing statutes against the backdrop of the 
common law.211 
 
205. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
206. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 66–67 (recognizing that harsh penalties applying to 
individuals under the age of eighteen appear to be unintended byproducts of statutory schemes rather 
than the intended consequences of legislative action). 
207. Cf. Shapiro, supra note 130, at 946 (“This notion of giving what might be called sub-
constitutional or extra-constitutional protection to certain rights and interests has long had a pervasive 
impact on the thinking of judges.”). 
208. E.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991). 
209. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20, at 605, 607–08. 
210. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 
105 (1934)); see also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952). 
211. E.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999) (“It is a well-established rule of 
construction that ‘[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the 
common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate 
the established meaning of these terms.’” (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 
322 (1992))); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (stating that “where 












The courts have a long history of reading the Due Process Clause in this 
fashion. For example, neither the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
nor the requirement that the government bear that burden appear in the text 
of the Constitution. And yet the courts have not permitted the states to do 
away with these protections.212 The Court will forbid the states from taking 
an action that “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions 
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”213 
But the Supreme Court has been hesitant to incorporate many common 
law principles via the Due Process Clause. It has characterized the showing 
that a principle is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental” as a heavy burden.214 And it has stated that 
due process requires that only the most basic safeguards be observed.215 This 
hesitance stems, at least in part, from the Court’s unwillingness to remove 
the ability of legislatures to experiment with other criminal justice rules and 
procedures.216 As a consequence, there are many common law principles 
with deep historical roots that have not been employed to cabin legislative 
dysfunction. Criminal clear statement rules would allow the courts to 
vindicate those principles without completely removing the ability of 
legislatures to experiment and set other criminal justice priorities. 
Legislatures would have to speak clearly and affirmatively if they wanted 
to act counter to those principles, but they would retain the power to do so. 
2. Justifying Criminal Clear Statement Rules 
An obvious reason to adopt criminal clear statement rules is that they 
would provide a counterweight to the legislative dysfunction associated 
with modern criminal law. As we explain in Part I, legislatures often 
respond to well-publicized crimes with hastily written criminal legislation. 
That legislation often fails to clarify important questions, such as the 
required mental state, and it often sweeps more broadly to include more 
conduct than the situation would appear to warrant. As a result, our criminal 
 
legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply”); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 
221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) (“[W]here words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known 
meaning at common law or in the law of this country they are presumed to have been used in that 
sense . . . .”); see also 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 76 (2d ed. 
1858) (stating that “we are to construe statutes according to the rules and reasons of the common law”). 
212. E.g., Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
213. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 523 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105). 
214. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 748–49 (2006) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197, 202 (1977)). 
215. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210. 
216. See id. at 207–08 (noting that the challenged law was part of a revision undertaken by the 












codes are littered with ambiguous and overly broad criminal laws. And, 
because our system relies so heavily on prosecutorial discretion, legislators 
can shift the blame for any unpopular prosecution, rather than being held 
responsible for their failure to write an appropriately specific and narrow 
statute in the first instance.  
Criminal clear statement rules could counteract some of these tendencies. 
They would force legislatures to address explicitly the issues that are subject 
to clear statement rules.217 If legislatures failed to specifically address an 
issue associated with a clear statement rule, then that issue would be 
resolved in favor of the more narrow, liberty-enhancing construction. And 
if legislators did explicitly address the issue, and if they opted for a statute 
that is less protective of liberty, then they would have to deal with the 
political ramifications associated with that decision. 
Clear statement rules are likely to be particularly effective at protecting 
otherwise sympathetic defendants or conduct. Take, for example, the recent 
changes that Congress made to federal child pornography laws.218 Some 
protested that the new statute did not exempt minors from the fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum penalty, and thus the statute could be triggered by a 
teenager who attempted to send a sexually explicit photo of him- or herself 
to a peer.219 Legislators did not bother to defend the application of such a 
penalty to minors; instead they simply ignored the concern and voted for the 
generally applicable language. 
Now imagine that the juvenile clear statement rule— that mandatory 
minimum penalties do not apply to juveniles, even if being tried as adults— 
had been in effect.220 Courts would interpret Congress’s failure to address 
juveniles in the statute as excluding everyone under eighteen from those 
penalties. If members of Congress had wanted to overcome that clear 
statement rule, its proponents would have to explicitly endorse an 
application of the law’s harsh penalties to juveniles, forcing them to grapple 
with the fact that the law could be used to prosecute the very children it was 
supposed to protect.221 One suspects that many legislators would not have 
been willing to vote in favor of language that specifically targeted minors. 
 
217. See Garrett, supra note 135, at 74 (stating that a clear statement rule “ensures that certain 
sensitive decisions are made explicitly and transparently by the most democratically accountable branch, 
the legislature”). 
218. Protecting Against Child Exploitation Act of 2017, H.R. 1761, 115th Cong. (2017). 
219. See Janet Burns, House Passes Bill That Could Have Teens Facing 15 Years for Trying to 
Sext, FORBES (June 2, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetwburns/2017/06/02/house-pa 
sses-bill-that-could-jail-teens-15-years-for-sexting/#69e501b04cf6 [https://perma.cc/J237-BHMX].  
220. See supra text accompanying notes 205–206. 
221. At present, most jurisdictions do not exempt minors from their child pornography laws. See 
Carissa Byrne Hessick & Judith M. Stinson, Juveniles, Sex Offenses, and the Scope of Substantive Law, 












Minors are a sympathetic group, and so there are political costs of treating 
young people harshly. Lawmakers who affirmatively wanted to impose 
those mandatory minimum penalties on minors would have to expend 
political capital to obtain majority support for legislation that explicitly 
punished the very group it was designed to protect. 
One might object to criminal clear statement rules on the grounds that 
determining the content of the criminal laws is a legislative, rather than a 
judicial, power.222 But the fact that legislatures have the power to determine 
the content of criminal laws does not tell us criminal clear statement rules 
are inappropriate. Indeed, the argument that judges must be careful not to 
encroach on the power of the legislature to write the laws ignores the long 
history—both in this country and in England—of judges taking an active 
role in interpreting criminal laws.223 Until relatively recently, judges were 
widely understood to have a significant role to play in shaping the content 
of the criminal law.224 The mere fact that the legislature had enacted a 
criminal statute did not settle the scope of criminal law.225 Instead, judges 
saw their role as reining in legislatures when their statutes departed too far 
from the criminal common law.226 
History also contains multiple examples of courts narrowing criminal 
liability in response to excessively punitive behavior by other criminal 
justice actors. For example, the rule of lenity grew out of the extremely 
harsh laws of seventeenth-century England.227 Because so many felony 
offenses carried an automatic sentence of death, judges adopted the 
“practice of construing all penal statutes as strictly as possible to avoid 
hanging those who did not deserve it.”228 The benefit of clergy provides a 
similar example. The benefit of clergy was “[o]riginally introduced to keep 
the royal courts from exercising jurisdiction over clerics charged with 
 
222. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (“[L]egislatures and not courts should 
define criminal activity.”); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ( “[T]he plain 
principle [is] that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It 
is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.”). 
223. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial 
Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1005, 1008–09, 1024–25 
(2001). 
224. See Hessick, supra note 1, at 979–81. 
225. E.g., BISHOP, supra note 211, §§ 91, 114 (discussing how to interpret overlapping statutes 
and statutes “in derogation of common law”). 
226. See Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 748, 
754–56 (1935); see generally Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 
(1908). 
227. Hall, supra note 226, at 749–51; Solan, supra note 64, at 87. 












crime.”229 But the benefit of clergy was subsequently extended to people 
outside of the church as a “device to ameliorate the rigors of a harsh paper 
criminal code,”230 and it eventually “evolved into a rule of lenity for all first-
time felony offenders.”231 In short, judges have, until recently, been active 
participants in shaping the content of criminal law and limiting overly 
punitive tendencies of other government officials. 
In any event, clear statement rules do not actually limit legislative 
power—they simply require legislatures to focus on particular issues and 
make extra efforts to state their intent.232 To be sure, courts can use clear 
statement rules to make the exercise of legislative power more difficult 
when that power is in tension with other important constitutional values. 
Crafting laws that contain clear statements takes time and effort. That is why 
some have referred to clear statement rules as exacting a “clarity tax” from 
lawmakers.233 As the clarity tax moniker indicates, clear statement rules 
make it more costly for legislatures to achieve certain ends. That increased 
cost is likely to result in fewer laws that encroach on important 
constitutional values.234 But clear statement rules do not actually prevent 
legislatures from enacting such laws. 
Importantly, in assessing whether clear statement rules provide an 
appropriate balance of power between the legislature and the courts, we 
should not lose sight of how much the legislature has failed in its 
responsibility to write the criminal laws. When people say that it is the job 
of the legislature to write the criminal law, that argument conjures up the 
image of lawmakers writing discrete, clearly-worded criminal statutes.235 
But, as we explained in Part I, that is not the case. Instead, legislatures often 
have passed overly broad and imprecise statutes.  
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effective in changing behavior. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
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As these overly broad and imprecise laws illustrate, the 
countermajoritarian critique of clear statement rules applies with less force 
in the context of criminal laws. The countermajoritarian critique “treats as 
uncontroversial the ‘democratic’ character of the legislative process as 
currently constituted. In other words, once a statute is enacted and comes to 
the court for interpretation, the democratic pedigree of the legislative 
process that produced the statute goes unchallenged and unscrutinized.”236 
But there are many reasons to challenge the “democratic pedigree” of 
criminal laws. Legislatures fail to do the hard work associated with crafting 
clearly and narrowly worded statutes that balance the need for public safety 
and the need to protect liberty. Instead, they leave it to prosecutors (and, to 
a lesser extent, judges) to determine what is legal or illegal.237 
Criminal clear statement rules would help society deal with these 
imprecise and overly broad statutes. They would give notice to both citizens 
and the legislature as to how imprecise statutes would be interpreted. 
Individuals who might otherwise have to decide whether to risk having an 
imprecise statute interpreted against them will be able to rely on clear 
language (or the absence thereof) in determining whether their conduct falls 
within a statute. Clear statement rules would also provide legislatures with 
better information about what is required to achieve a certain result. If 
legislators know that a statute will be interpreted in a particular fashion 
unless they say otherwise, they will be able to make better ex ante decisions 
about what language to choose in order to criminalize certain types of 
behavior.238 
Criminal clear statement rules would provide more certainty and 
predictability than the rule of lenity or the vagueness doctrine—both in 
terms of when they apply and in terms of how a judge will interpret a statute. 
Lenity and vagueness have been inconsistently applied because it is unclear 
when a statute is sufficiently ambiguous or sufficiently vague for the 
doctrines to apply.239 In contrast, clear statement rules have a well-defined 
trigger—the clear statement rule flags a particular issue, such as whether a 
mandatory minimum penalty applies to juveniles. And unlike the rule of 
lenity—which tells judges only that they must construe an ambiguous 
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238. Cf. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994) (justifying a clear statement rule 
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statute in the defendant’s favor—clear statement rules dictate more 
precisely how the judge will interpret the statute. 
Because clear statement rules can be applied in a straightforward fashion, 
they not only provide more guidance for legislators and the general public, 
but they are also less likely to trigger complaints about judges usurping the 
legislative role. That is because, unlike lenity and vagueness, there will be 
less doubt about what a legislature must do to satisfy a clear statement rule. 
Language is inherently ambiguous,240 and when courts have rejected 
vagueness challenges they have sometimes done so on the theory that the 
legislature could not draft a specific statute that was sufficiently 
comprehensive to cover every inevitability.241 In contrast, clear statement 
rules identify the particular issues about which legislatures must speak 
clearly. 
More generally, clear statement rules could help to ease political pressure 
on judges. Judges often face political pressure not to issue defense-friendly 
interpretations of statutes. That pressure is especially intense for elected 
judges.242 Clear statement rules might relieve some of that political pressure. 
For example, clear statement rules could disrupt the common complaint that 
a judge’s pro-defense ruling allowed a dangerous criminal to “go free.”243 
Clear statement rules allow judges to place those decisions at the feet of the 
legislature. That is, a judicial opinion could explain that legislators were on 
notice and, if they wanted to intrude upon this particular constitutional 
principle or historical value, then they needed to do so explicitly and 
unambiguously. In this way, clear statement rules would “stop the buck” 
where it belongs—at the legislature.244 
This buck-stopping feature of criminal clear statement rules could 
forestall charges of judicial activism.245 At present, legislatures are cast as 
the sole appropriate decisionmaker in substantive criminal law;246 and any 
effort by judges to intrude upon the substance of criminal law is decried as 
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activism.247 Criminal clear statement rules would re-cast judges in the role 
of protectors of individual rights and constitutional guarantees—a role that 
the courts already play in other areas of the law. Judges could use their 
opinions as an opportunity to explain why the particular principle or value 
is so important, and thus why it is important to protect that principle or value 
unless the legislature decides otherwise.248 Because the legislature is still 
free to make a contrary decision, the court can credibly claim that its 
decision is not thwarting the majority’s will. To the contrary, clear statement 
rules ensure that legislatures are making important policy decisions because 
they minimize that possibility that the judge is allowing her policy 
preferences to shape the interpretation of less-than-clear statutory text.249 
Indeed, a judge could go so far as to claim that the absence of a clear 
statement about the issue was an indication from the legislature that it 
wanted to protect liberty or rights in this situation because the legislature 
itself was on notice as to how the statute would be interpreted.250 
What is more, because clear statement rules also serve as external 
constraints on judicial preferences, criticisms that judges are simply 
indulging their own policy preferences will have less force.251 Put 
differently, clear statement rules require judges to issue certain rulings 
unless the legislature explicitly and unambiguously says otherwise. 
Therefore, we cannot say that a judge whose ruling is based on a clear 
statement rule is using her interpretive discretion to achieve some hidden 
goal because the clear statement rule restricts judicial discretion.252  
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To be sure, some might argue that judges are acting according to their 
own policy preferences in those cases where a clear statement rule is 
initially adopted.253 In such cases the judges’ discretion is not yet restricted. 
But even in those cases, charges that judges are acting to vindicate their own 
policy preferences are not likely to be as strong as in cases where they 
interpret cases without clear statement rules. That is because adopting a 
clear statement rule limits judicial discretion in future cases. The judges do 
not know what their policy preferences will be in those future cases, and so 
they are likely to be more circumspect about adopting clear statement rules 
that will govern them going forward. Indeed, that is why some opponents 
of broad judicial discretion have advocated that judges adopt more bright-
line rules—because those rules reduce judicial discretion in future cases.254 
3. Criminal Clear Statement Rules in Practice 
Before turning to a detailed discussion of our two specific criminal clear 
statement rules, a few words are in order about how criminal clear statement 
rules would operate, as a general matter, in practice. In particular, we want 
to address how legislatures might satisfy clear statement rules, as well as 
the question of retroactivity. 
Courts should permit legislatures to overcome criminal clear statement 
rules only on a statute-by-statute basis. Legislatures should not be permitted 
to overcome a clear statement rule by a legislative enactment that applies to 
the entire penal code or to entire sections of the code.255 So, for example, a 
legislature could not satisfy a clear statement rule about juveniles and 
mandatory minimum penalties by enacting a single, generally-applicable 
statute that says “all mandatory minimum sentences in the penal code apply 
to juvenile defendants who are tried as adults.” If legislatures were 
permitted to satisfy a clear statement rule through such a general statute, 
then many benefits associated with clear statement rules would be lost. That 
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is because the clear statement rule would no longer require legislatures to 
pay the “clarity tax” and internalize the political costs of their clear 
statement with each new piece of legislation.256 Nor would it be clear 
whether future legislators actually intended the general rule to apply, 
because they would not be required to confront and decide the issue each 
time that they enacted a new law with a mandatory minimum penalty.257  
Some might think that clear statement rules will not serve as a 
particularly onerous clarity tax because legislatures could develop stock 
phrases to routinely insert into new criminal legislation. Once a stock phrase 
had been developed, inserting a stock phrase might not require that a 
legislator spend much time to overcome a clear statement rule when passing 
a new criminal law. But, as our example of the juvenile punishment clear 
statement rule illustrates, there may still be political costs because 
legislators would still have to endorse applying harsh penalties to juveniles.  
 Also, because we expect criminal clear statement rules to change how 
many statutes are interpreted, we feel compelled to offer an opinion about 
whether these interpretive rules ought to apply retroactively. In short, the 
answer is “yes.” When a court adopts a new clear statement rule that protects 
a particular criminal law value, it ought to apply that clear statement rule to 
all criminal statutes—including criminal statutes that were enacted before 
the court first announced the rule. 
To be clear, the question of retroactivity presents challenges for all clear 
statement rules; it is not unique to criminal clear statement rules. In the 
context of non-criminal clear statement rules, the courts have largely 
dodged this question, rather than addressed it head-on. In particular, they 
ordinarily fail to acknowledge when they are announcing a new clear 
statement rule; instead they suggest that the rule predates the decision.258 
Some might argue against retroactivity based on the idea of dialogue 
between the courts and the legislature.259 A clear statement rule places the 
legislature on notice that it must make an unambiguous, affirmative 
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statement to accomplish a certain end. Before a clear statement rule is 
announced, the legislature is not on notice about the form that its legislation 
has to take. Thus, so the argument goes, it is inappropriate to apply these 
rules retroactively.  
We do not find the dialogue argument against retroactivity persuasive. 
The idea that judges ought to give notice seems attractive, but it does not 
hold up under closer scrutiny. Although it has long been thought that 
legislatures must give notice of any rule change before using that rule, this 
limitation is largely limited to rules that burden private rights.260 An 
interpretive rule aimed at legislatures is not a rule aimed at private rights. In 
addition, the same notice limitations do not apply to judges.261 That is why, 
for example, when a court interprets a statute for the first time, that 
interpretation nonetheless applies to the defendant in the case before it.262  
More generally, when courts have shifted interpretive methodologies, 
they have not let the lack of notice to legislatures stop them. Take, for 
example, the relatively recent shift to textualism. Before courts embraced 
textualism, they would often seek to construe statutes in a way that would 
best further legislative purpose.263 As a result, legislators were probably less 
careful about the precise text of a statute; they knew that if the legislative 
history of a statute made their purpose clear, courts would endeavor to 
construe the statute in a way that was compatible with that purpose. But 
textualists do not interpret statutes in light of the legislative purpose; they 
interpret based on the text.264 And, as a result, textualists may never consider 
the committee reports, floor speeches, or legislative history that those 
legislators assumed would be part of any future litigation over the meaning 
of the statute. Textualists routinely interpret statutes that were enacted long 
before the rise of textualism. Yet, textualists have not limited their 
methodology to only statutes enacted after legislators were on notice that 
these other legislative materials would not be considered to interpret the 
text. 
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As the textualism example illustrates, the idea that judges and legislators 
are engaged in a dialogue when it comes to statutory interpretation might be 
best understood as a legal fiction.265 To be clear, there is evidence that those 
who draft statutes are familiar with interpretive rules, and that those rules 
may affect how statutes are drafted.266 But that does not mean that judges 
have constrained (or should constrain) themselves when interpreting 
statutes that pre-date a shift in their interpretive rules. That may explain why 
retroactivity concerns have not diverted the courts from using clear 
statement rules that vindicate non-criminal law values. 
Nonetheless, the retroactivity question might give us greater pause in the 
context of criminal statutes. That is because a more narrow interpretation of 
a criminal statute under a clear statement rule could result in the release of 
people from prison who were convicted under that statute. In this respect, 
we have to decide whether clear statement rules would apply retroactively 
to individual defendants, rather than to individual statutes. Again, we think 
that they should. 
 As a general matter, when courts construe a statute, the legal fiction is 
that they are simply declaring what the law always meant rather than 
changing the meaning of the statute going forward.267 As a consequence, 
when the Supreme Court has issued a definitive interpretation of a federal 
criminal statute that narrows the scope of the statute, lower courts will apply 
that more narrow interpretation on collateral review. 268 That is to say, even 
if a defendant’s conviction has already become final, she can file a habeas 
corpus petition to argue that her conduct did not fall within the statute as 
newly interpreted by the courts.269 
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Some might argue that this individual retroactivity counsels against 
adopting criminal clear statement rules because post-conviction claims by 
defendants could lead to the release of dangerous defendants. But we are 
not convinced that this should deter courts from adopting criminal clear 
statement rules. That is because we believe that the benefits of clear 
statement rules outweigh the costs of retroactive application.270 In 
particular, we do not believe that many defendants will actually be released 
from prison if these clear statement rules were applied retroactively, and the 
most dangerous offenders are the least likely to be released.  
There are at least three reasons why the number of people affected is 
likely to be small. First, legislatures are likely to act quickly if they want to 
overcome clear statement rules. Criminal legislation is popular, and the 
legislative process is less balanced than in other areas.271 If a statute is 
construed narrowly under a clear statement rule, legislatures are likely to 
react quickly. As a result, the retroactivity problem is not likely to persist 
for very long—at least not for those statutes where there is a true legislative 
consensus in favor of a broader or harsher statute. 
Second, there must be a specific ruling involving the particular statute in 
order for that decision to apply retroactively to other defendants convicted 
under the same statute.272 Even if one defendant obtained a narrowing 
interpretation of a statute, other defendants who have been convicted under 
that same statute may serve their entire sentence (or a significant portion 
thereof) before they would be able to navigate the collateral review process 
and obtain release.273 And, in the meantime, the legislature can enact a 
revised statute that includes a clear statement, which would apply to any 
future defendants. 
Third, even those defendants who were convicted under laws that were 
subsequently narrowed by clear statement rules will not necessarily be 
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released. That is because the defendant will have to prove not only that she 
was convicted under an incorrectly broad reading of the statute, but also that 
she is factually innocent of the charges.274 In rebutting that claim, the 
government is not limited to the existing record, but can present any 
admissible evidence.275 
Even if the defendant would no longer qualify for conviction under that 
particular statute, that does not mean she will necessarily be released from 
jail. That is because the people serving lengthy sentences for serious 
crimes—i.e., those people who would most likely benefit from criminal 
clear statement rules276—are likely guilty of some other crime for which 
they could be convicted. For example, many states allow a defendant to be 
convicted of murder even if she did not intend to bring about the death of 
another; it is enough that the defendant acted recklessly and with a disregard 
for the sanctity of human life, and in so doing, caused the death of another. 
Some states permit such a conviction explicitly in their statutes, while others 
have allowed such convictions as a matter of judicial interpretation.277 If a 
court were to adopt the mens rea clear statement rule that we propose below, 
then defendants convicted of depraved heart murder in the absence of a 
statute would no longer be guilty of murder, though they would still be 
guilty of a lesser homicide offense. The state would be free to retry them on 
those other, lesser-included charges, such as manslaughter.278 And if 
legislatures wanted to continue to treat such people as murderers, they could 
write a statute that does so explicitly. 
*     *     * 
In sum, criminal clear statement rules can help ameliorate legislative 
dysfunction. And they can do so while maintaining an appropriate balance 
of power between the courts and the legislative branch and providing 
political insulation for judges’ decisions. 
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III. EXAMPLES OF CRIMINAL CLEAR STATEMENT RULES 
The primary purpose of this Article is to identify criminal clear statement 
rules as an important doctrinal tool to combat the legislative dysfunction 
surrounding criminal laws. But we have also chosen to propose two 
particular clear statement rules. We have done this to give a clearer sense of 
what a criminal clear statement rule would look like, how such a rule could 
be justified, and how such a rule would operate in practice. To be sure, we 
believe that courts ought to adopt the particular criminal clear statement 
rules we propose. But it is not necessary to accept these particular rules in 
order to accept the broader idea of criminal clear statement rules. 
The first clear statement rule we propose involves mental states: we 
propose that courts read all criminal statutes as requiring a knowing mental 
state for every material element. The second clear statement rule involves 
the harm that the defendant caused or intended: we propose that a defendant 
must have caused or intended to cause substantial harm in order for her 
conduct to fall within the scope of a criminal statute. Both of our clear 
statement rules are limited to the interpretation of felony statutes. And, as 
with all clear statement rules, they can be overcome by an affirmative and 
unambiguous statement by the legislature. 
Out of many potential clear statement rules, we have chosen these two 
particular clear statement rules for specific reasons. First, we deliberately 
chose one rule that is relatively radical and one rule that is quite tame. The 
substantial harm rule—though supported by both history and policy—is 
likely to strike readers as a dramatic departure from current doctrine. The 
mens rea rule, in contrast, represents only a minor departure from current 
doctrine; the Supreme Court has, on occasion, flirted with adopting a similar 
clear statement rule.279 Second, we deliberately chose one rule that 
addressed a problem associated with imprecise statutes (the mens rea rule) 
and one rule that addressed a problem with overly broad statutes (the 
substantial harm rule). Of course these proposed rules do not address all of 
the problems associated with imprecise statutes or overly broad statutes. But 
they do address problems that have resulted in repeated litigation and 
doctrinal confusion. 
A. Mens Rea Clear Statement Rule 
Nowhere is the need for clear statement rules greater than in the area of 
mens rea. Legislative efforts to address confusion surrounding mental states 
have failed. Many modern cases of criminal statutory interpretation involve 
 











disputes about required mental states. The current doctrine surrounding 
mens rea is confusing and unpredictable. A criminal clear statement rule 
that specifies a default mental state and applies that mental state to all 
elements of a crime could bring significant clarity and predictability to the 
law. 
Sometimes legislatures completely omit mental state terminology from 
the definition of a crime. For example, imagine that a statute simply read “it 
shall be a misdemeanor to come to class unprepared.” That statute omits any 
mental state, and an interpreting court would have to decide whether to read 
in a mental state requirement and, if so, what mental state requirement to 
read in. A judge might require that a student know that she was unprepared. 
Or, the judge might require only that the student be reckless or negligent as 
to whether she was unprepared. Or, the judge might not require any mental 
state, leaving the student strictly liable for appearing in class unprepared. 
We refer to this statutory problem as an issue of omission.  
Now, imagine that the statute reads that “it shall be a crime to knowingly 
come to class unprepared when a student is on call.” This statute raises an 
issue of modification. It is clear that the student must know that they are 
coming to class. Most judges would assume that the crime also requires the 
student to know that they are unprepared. The difficult modification issue 
is whether the student must also know that they are on call that day. The 
problem here is not one of omission, but rather one of modification—we do 
not know to which elements the stated mental state is supposed to apply. 
We propose one clear statement rule to deal with issues of omission and 
issues of modification: absent a clear statement to the contrary, every 
material element of a felony offense requires proof of a knowing mental 
state. Under this rule a knowing mental state requirement would be applied 
to all material elements of a statutory crime that omitted any mention of 
mental state. Similarly, a knowing mental state requirement would be 
applied in the case of an ambiguous modification issue.  
One might say that the Supreme Court has long employed a de facto clear 
statement rule with respect to the omission issue. The Court has long held 
that it will not assume that Congress intended to omit a mental state 
requirement simply from the fact that none was given in the text of the 
statute.280 But there are exceptions to this general presumption, and those 
exceptions are not very well delineated. 
One exception is the public welfare offense doctrine. The standard 
definition of a public welfare offense is a crime that is regulatory in nature, 
 
280. E.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 












addresses threats to public health, public safety, public morals, or public 
order, and that carries a modest fine or short incarceration term.281 All public 
welfare offenses are malum prohibitum as opposed to malum in se,282 but 
not all malum prohibitum offenses are public welfare offenses.283 If a court 
finds an offense to be a public welfare offense, it will not read in a mental 
state. But the public welfare doctrine has become very confused because the 
Court has struggled with how to treat dangerous regulated activities. In 
some cases the Court reads in a mens rea requirement even where the 
activity regulated is dangerous. But in other cases the Court refuses to read 
traditional mens rea requirements into regulatory statutes dealing with 
dangerous behavior. 
Take, for example, the thinly-reasoned opinion in United States v. 
Balint.284 There, the Court refused to read a mens rea requirement into a 
narcotics statute that required tax stamps for certain types of drugs. 
Dismissing the due process challenge largely out of hand, the Court 
observed that the narcotics statute “merely uses a criminal penalty to secure 
recorded evidence of the disposition of such drugs as a means of taxing and 
restraining the traffic.”285 As such, the statute fell into a category of 
regulatory measures whose “manifest purpose is to require every person 
dealing in drugs to ascertain at his peril whether that which he sells comes 
within the inhibition of the statute.”286 
Balint muddles the traditional distinction between malum in se and 
malum prohibitum offenses. The Balint Court characterized the narcotics 
statute as “a taxing act with the incidental purpose of minimizing the spread 
of addiction to the use of poisonous and demoralizing drugs.”287 A taxation 
crime seems to be a clear example of a malum prohibitum offense. The only 
reason one should pay taxes is that the government prohibits failure to pay 
them. In contrast, a vice statute aimed at restraining use of a “poisonous and 
demoralizing drug” would seem to be malum in se; poisonous and 
demoralizing substances sound like things that are themselves evil. Did the 
Balint Court refuse to read in a mens rea requirement because the statute 
was a mere regulatory measure that did not mark the offender as a serious 
 
281. Darryl K. Brown, Public Welfare Offenses, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 
862, 863 (Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014).  
282. Id. 
283. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (holding that criminal violations of 
food stamp regulations are not strict liability offenses); U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 437–38 (holding 
that the Sherman Antitrust Act’s criminal provisions do not create strict liability). 
284. 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
285. Id. at 254. 
286. Id. As is often the case when a court declares a legislative purpose to be “manifest,” the Court 
cited no legislative history supporting its strict liability reading. 












criminal or because the statute was aimed at a dangerous social evil whose 
violators deserved no quarter?  
The Court subsequently tried to clarify the issue. In United States v. 
Dotterweich, the Court stated that otherwise innocent people “in responsible 
relation to a public danger” are subject to criminal liability in the interests 
of the larger good.288 The strict liability that this “responsible relation to a 
public danger” standard created was something that the criminal law had 
long abhorred. And so, in Morissette v. United States, the Court tried to put 
the strict liability genie back in the bottle and to label the bottle more 
clearly.289 Morissette clearly stated that a traditional common law offense 
such as theft or conversion cannot be a public welfare offense. The Court 
also offered four factors that might indicate that a crime is a public welfare 
offense: 1) the criminalization is not of an actual injury but the risk of injury; 
2) a person could prevent the risk with relative ease; 3) the penalties are 
small; and 4) there is little stigma associated with conviction.290  
Unfortunately, these factors proved to be unreliable predictors of the 
Court’s future decisions. Instead, subsequent cases strongly suggested that 
the Court would not read in mental states to statutes that dealt with 
dangerous substances, but would read them in if the subject matter of the 
regulation was not dangerous.291 In those cases the Court justified not 
 
288. 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943). In order to reach this decision, however, the Dotterweich Court 
had to read in not only a mental state, but also congressional intent to create criminal liability for both 
the corporation and the corporation’s officers. Id. at 282–83. 
In dissent, however, Justice Murphy raised serious questions about whether Congress had intended 
any such thing. Murphy argued that courts should only find such individual criminal liability when the 
intent to create it was clearly stated by Congress:  
[I]n the absence of clear statutory authorization it is inconsistent with established canons of 
criminal law to rest liability on an act in which the accused did not participate and of which he 
had no personal knowledge. Before we place the stigma of a criminal conviction upon any such 
citizen the legislative mandate must be clear and unambiguous. 
Id. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy’s dissent in Dotterweich represents a path not taken 
by the Court. Although he did not use the phrase “clear statement rules,” he argued that strict criminal 
liability should be applied only when clearly stated by Congress. Id. at 292–93. 
289. 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (“The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when 
inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature 
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal 
individual to choose between good and evil.”). 
290. Id. at 256. 
291. Compare United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 609–10 (1971) (holding that because hand 
grenades are highly dangerous offensive weapons no mental state was required with respect to the 
registration element under the National Firearms Act), and United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. 
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564–65 (1971) (holding that a statute making it a crime to “knowingly violate” any 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission’s regulations for the transportation of corrosive liquids did not 
require the defendant to have knowledge of those regulations because of the dangerous nature of the 
materials shipped), with United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 US. 422, 445–46 (1978) (reading in an 
intent requirement to criminal antitrust violations), and Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 












applying any mental state requirement for an element of a crime on the 
theory that the dangerousness of the activities being regulated should have 
made the defendant aware of the relevant regulations.292 
The Court came close to establishing a clear statement rule in Staples v. 
United States.293 That case asked whether the defendant had to know that 
his rifle was a machine gun in order to be guilty of violating the National 
Firearms Act. Lower courts had split on the issue, and the trial court 
instructed the jury that the defendant simply had to know that he possessed 
a “dangerous device of a type as would alert one to the likelihood of 
regulation.”294 The Court held that, notwithstanding the dangerousness of 
machine guns, the government had to prove that the defendant knew his 
firearm was capable of fully automatic fire. The Court emphasized the 
severity of the penalty involved—a possible ten year prison sentence—as 
well as the stigma that any felony conviction carries.295  
The Court came tantalizingly close to adopting a clear statement rule. 
But it ultimately decided not to do so:  
In this view, absent a clear statement from Congress that mens rea is 
not required, we should not apply the public welfare offense rationale 
to interpret any statute defining a felony offense as dispensing with 
mens rea. 
 We need not adopt such a definitive rule of construction to decide 
this case, however. Instead, we note only that where, as here, 
dispensing with mens rea would require the defendant to have 
knowledge only of traditionally lawful conduct, a severe penalty is a 
further factor tending to suggest that Congress did not intend to 
eliminate a mens rea requirement. In such a case, the usual 
presumption that a defendant must know the facts that make his 
conduct illegal should apply.296 
Unfortunately, the rule that the Court announced in Staples is anything 
 
stamps, unlike hand grenades or sulfuric acid, were neither dangerous nor subject to stringent 
regulation). 
292. Ironically and instructively for our purposes, in International Minerals the most relevant 
piece of legislative history was generated in response to a request to Congress from the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC) for a clearer statement of congressional intent. The ICC’s request for a 
clear statement by Congress had been prompted by a circuit court decision holding that knowledge of 
the regulations was required. Int’l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 567–68 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing United 
States v. Chi. Express, Inc., 235 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1956); St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 
220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955)). 
293. 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
294. Id. at 604. 
295. Id. at 616. 












but clear. Whether one is engaged in “traditionally lawful conduct”—as 
opposed to the sort of conduct that would alert one to the likelihood of 
government regulation—lies largely in the eye of the beholders.   
In the wake of Staples, confusion has reigned about the scope of the 
public welfare offense doctrine. Does the dangerousness of the offense 
mean that no mental state is required, as was the case with the hand grenade 
in Freed and the sulfuric acid in International Minerals?297 Or does the 
possible innocence of a person facing felony conviction and prison mean 
that a mental state must be read in, as was the case with the machine gun 
owner in Staples?298   
Statutes that impose harsher penalties on traditional crimes based on an 
additional aggravating element pose similar modification problems. 
Legislatures often leave the mental state requirements for the aggravating 
elements ambiguous, and courts often engage in tortured logic to avoid 
applying traditional mental state requirements to these additional elements. 
United States v. Chin illustrates this problem.299 Chin was charged and 
convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute.300 He was also 
charged with the separate federal offense of using a person under eighteen 
years of age to avoid detection for a drug offense in violation of the Juvenile 
 
297. For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “first-degree burglary possession of a 
dangerous weapon . . . is not ambiguous and does not include a mens rea requirement with respect to a 
defendant’s possession of a dangerous weapon.” State v. Garcia-Gutierrez, 844 N.W.2d 519, 526 (Minn. 
2014). In United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500 (D.C. Cir. 2012), the D.C. Circuit held that a statute 
that imposes a mandatory thirty-year sentence for any person who carries a machinegun while 
committing a crime of violence “does not require the government to prove that a defendant knew that 
the weapon he used, carried, or possessed was a machinegun.” Id. at 516. The Ninth Circuit held in 
United States v. Jefferson, 791 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2015), that the government need not prove that the 
defendant knew the specific type and quantity of the drugs he imported in order to trigger a ten-year 
mandatory minimum under title 21 U.S.C. section 960(b)(1)(H). Id. at 1019. 
298. The Minnesota Supreme Court held in In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 
2000), that the “[State] was required to prove that [the juvenile] knew he possessed the knife on school 
property as an element of the . . . offense charged.” Id. at 810 (emphasis added). The Nebraska Supreme 
Court held in State v. Carman, 872 N.W.2d 559 (Neb. 2015), that “public welfare offenses such as traffic 
infractions which do not contain the element of criminal intent cannot support convictions for 
manslaughter.” Id. at 565. The California Supreme Court held in People v. King, 133 P.3d 636 (Cal. 
2006), that a statute prohibiting possession of a variety of weapons was not a public welfare offense, 
thus requiring that the prosecution prove the possessor’s knowledge of the weapon’s illegal 
characteristics. Id. at 641. Similarly, the California Supreme Court held in In re Jorge M., 4 P.3d 297 
(Cal. 2000), that a statute prohibiting the possession of an assault weapon was not intended to define a 
strict liability offense and required either proof of either negligence or knowledge with respect to the 
characteristics of the weapon. Id. at 299. The Second Circuit held in United States v. Bronx Reptiles, 
Inc., 217 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000), that “the government was required to prove not only that the defendant 
knowingly caused the transportation to the United States of a wild animal or bird, but also that the 
defendant knew the conditions under which the animal or bird was transported were ‘inhumane or 
unhealthful.’” Id. at 83. 
299. 981 F.2d 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 












Drug Trafficking Act of 1986.301 The text of that statute makes it a crime to 
“knowingly and intentionally . . . employ, hire, use, persuade, induce, entice, 
or coerce, a person under eighteen years of age to assist in avoiding 
detection or apprehension for any [listed federal drug offense] by any . . . 
law enforcement official.”302 Despite the fact that the language clearly 
required not just knowing but intentional conduct and the fact that both 
adverbs preceded the age element, the D.C. Circuit followed three other 
circuits in holding that a defendant did not have to know that the person 
employed was a juvenile to be guilty of this separate crime.303  
In an opinion written by then-circuit judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the 
Chin court brushed aside the use of the phrase “knowingly and 
intentionally” as “not a model of meticulous drafting.”304 Ginsburg asserted 
that “[o]ne cannot tell from the words alone whether the person’s juvenile 
status must be known and ‘intended,’ or whether it suffices that the act of 
using a person to avoid detection be ‘knowing[] and intentional[].’”305 The 
court seized what it saw as ambiguity to hold that a defendant need neither 
be purposeful nor even knowing as to the age of the juvenile employed. The 
holding was clearly based on policy concerns: the court said that to require 
even knowledge would be to “invite blindness by drug dealers to the age of 
youths they employ” and to ignore the special purpose of the statute to 
“protect a vulnerable class defined by age.”306  
The rule of lenity operated as little more than a speed bump on the Chin 
court’s road to a strict liability reading of the statute. That is because lenity 
applied only if the court could not infer the statute’s meaning. The Chin 
court inferred that no mental state was required because it was “implausible 
that Congress would have placed on the prosecution the often impossible 
burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a defendant knew the 
youth he enticed was under eighteen.”307  
 
301. Id. at 1276 n.2 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(2) (2012)). 
302. Id. at 1279 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(2)). 
303. Id. at 1279–80 (citing United States v. Williams, 922 F.2d 737, 738–39 (11th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Valencia-Roldan, 893 F.2d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Carter, 854 
F.2d 1102, 1108–09 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
304. Id. at 1279. 
305. Id. (alteration in original). 
306. Id. at 1280. 
307. Id. In a final flourish that is fairly typical of such opinions, the Chin court used the fact that 
the crime of using a juvenile in the illegal drug trade was a separate crime from selling drugs as a reason 
not to read in a knowledge requirement. Because the offense clearly required knowingly and 
intentionally using another for the purpose of concealing a violation of federal narcotic laws, this was 
not a case where interpreting the statute broadly “threatens to criminalize ‘apparently innocent 
conduct.’” Id. This final move adds insult to injury. Purposely concealing an ongoing violation of federal 
narcotics laws is already punishable under basic principles of complicity. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 












Chin is noteworthy only because it is typical. Typical not only of how 
courts handle ambiguous mens rea modification issues, but also, more 
generally, of the way courts twist themselves into knots dealing with 
unclear, or potentially unpopular, statutory language.  
The confusion and unpredictability of the Court’s mens rea doctrines 
establish the need for clear statement rules. Judges interpreting statutes 
should not have to balance innocence against dangerousness, to decide what 
types of danger mean that an offender is not acting innocently, or to choose 
between competing ways of framing the behavior in question that make it 
seem more or less innocent. Such choices are value-laden, subjective, and 
yield unpredictable results. Therefore, those choices should be made by 
legislators in clear and politically accountable ways. 
But legislatures have failed to make such choices—or at least they have 
failed to make such choices clear. Take, for example, the recent mens rea 
reform efforts.308 A number of groups have been advocating for reforms to 
mens rea in federal criminal law. In particular, they have advocated 
adopting a statutory default mental state requirement, as well as a 
requirement that a defendant knew that their behavior was illegal if the 
statute criminalizes behavior that a reasonable person would not know was 
prohibited.309 But, as Ben Levin has detailed, these reform efforts have faced 
stiff opposition from those who want to ensure robust prosecution of 
environmental and other regulatory crimes.310 As a result, federal crimes 
continue to fail to specify a mental state. And political disagreement ensures 
that the ambiguity in these statutes will endure. 
Our clear statement rule not only repairs the damage done by the Court’s 
mishandling of the public welfare doctrine, but it also removes ambiguity 
as a tool for legislative compromise. A clear statement rule that requires 
legislatures to clearly state if they intend to impose criminal liability for 
defendants who acted without knowledge removes the need for the public 
welfare doctrine. And it makes the stakes clear for legislatures—they cannot 
omit mental states from statutes in the hope that courts will later interpret 
statutes in a way that furthers their own agenda. 
 
accomplice intentionally encourages or assists, in the sense that this purpose is to encourage or assist 
another in the commission of a crime as to which the accomplice has the requisite mental state.”). 
The Supreme Court has used similar reasoning in interpreting mandatory minimum sentencing 
provisions. See, e.g., Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 574–76 (2009). But see Flores-Figueroa v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 646, 656–57 (2009).  
308. E.g., Mens Rea Reform Act of 2018, S. 3118, 115th Cong. (2018).  
309. Benjamin Levin, Mens Rea Reform and Its Discontents, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
491, 509–12 (2019). 












Of course, it is not enough to say that there ought to be a clear statement 
rule about mens rea; it is also necessary to state what that rule would be. 
That is because, if there is to be a presumption against strict liability, courts 
must supply a particular mental state when faced with statutes that omit a 
mental state but do not include a clear statement in favor of strict liability. 
Put differently, there must be a default mens rea standard that applies when 
statutes are unclear. We believe that the default standard ought to be 
“knowingly.”311 
There are many reasons to adopt a clear statement rule that imposes a 
default mens rea standard, and thus requires legislatures to speak clearly if 
they intent to impose strict liability. First, such a rule is strongly supported 
by history. The common law has always been hostile to strict liability. 
Outside of statutory rape and a few other criminal offenses relating to the 
protection of minors, strict liability did not exist in the common law of 
crimes.312 Scienter—knowledge of wrongfulness—was required at common 
law not just for criminal law but for many actions in tort and contract as 
well. This hostility to stricter standards of liability made the passage to the 
American colonies.313 The public welfare doctrine developed as an 
exception to the general rule that all crimes required a truly culpable mental 
state. The Model Penal Code went a step further and precluded strict 
liability for all crimes.314  
Second, requiring a clear statement for strict liability also finds support 
in the Constitution’s protection of notice.315 Notice is a “core due process 
concept[].”316 Courts have traced its protection in the Constitution to both 
 
311. In selecting this standard, we are relying—as many do, in modern criminal law—on the mens 
rea categories articulated in the Model Penal Code. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (AM. LAW INST. 
1985). Those categories have been enormously influential in the years since the Model Penal Code was 
written, as they brought rigor and precision to the concept of mens rea that had previously been lacking. 
312. See LAFAVE, supra note 117, § 5.5 (“For several centuries (at least since 1600) the different 
common law crimes have been so defined as to require, for guilt, that the defendant’s acts or omissions 
be accompanied by one or more of the various types of fault (intertion, knowledge, recklessness or—
more rarely—negligence); a person is not guily of a common law crime without one of these kinds of 
fault.”). 
313. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952) (“Crime, as a compound concept, 
generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was 
congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in American soil. As the states 
codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts 
assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent 
was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation.” (footnote omitted)).  
314. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). The Model Penal Code recognized 
the possibility of strict liability for mere infractions, an offense below the level of a misdemeanor and 
an offense for which the penalty can only be a fine. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 
1985).  
315. See Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Strict Liability Offenses, Incarceration, and the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1065, 1088 (2014). 












the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses.317 Strict liability crimes fail to 
give notice because they allow punishment based only on conduct, no matter 
how blameless. Even a reasonable belief is not defense to a strict liability 
standard. A defendant who was entirely unaware of material circumstances 
could be punished under a strict liability standard—even if the defendant 
had taken all reasonable precautions.318 
Importantly, our clear statement rule is not simply aimed at strict 
liability; it also sets a default mental state of “knowingly.” That is to say, 
unless the legislature clearly says otherwise, prosecutors will have to 
demonstrate that defendants acted knowingly—rather than merely 
negligently or recklessly—with respect to each element of a crime or with 
respect to aggravating factors.  
For example, our proposed clear statement rule would have decided Chin 
differently. Because Congress did not clearly state that it intended to impose 
liability even if the defendant did not know the age of the person that he or 
she employed in a drug transaction, courts would have no choice but to 
interpret the statute to require the government to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant knew the person employed was under eighteen. 
To be sure, our preferred default mental state does not have the same 
historical pedigree as a clear statement rule against strict liability. Many 
common law crimes, such as battery, are general intent crimes and require 
only a general awareness of one’s conduct.319 One could easily translate this 
general intent requirement into the modern mens rea category of 
“recklessness”—that is, the conscious disregard of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk. This may explain why the Model Penal Code adopted a 
default mens rea of recklessness for statutes that omitted a mental state.320 
But, despite the weak historical foundation, we think that “knowing” is 
the appropriate default standard for a mens rea clear statement rule. For one 
thing, conscious disregard of a substantial risk is a somewhat convoluted 
mental state to apply to non-result crimes. How does one recklessly assault 
someone? Commit a burglary? Or steal property? For another, voters tend 
to imagine the worst case scenario when evaluating criminal legislation and 
criminal punishment.321 It is quite clear that people perceive crimes 
 
317. See Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 439–40, 440 n.12 (1997). 
318. See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 401, 417 (1993); Richard A. Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in the Criminal Law, 12 
STAN. L. REV. 731, 731–32 (1960). 
319. E.g., LAFAVE, supra note 307, at 267–68, 861–63. 
320. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
321. When asked about crime in the abstract, voters (and presumably legislators) imagine an 
aggravated version of the crime. For example, when asked what the sentence for burglary ought to be, 
voters falsely assume that burglars are commonly armed, that the average burglar has a longer criminal 












committed knowingly to be more serious, and more deserving of 
punishment, than crimes committed recklessly.322 Thus, knowledge (rather 
than recklessness) likely better captures what both legislators and voters 
imagine when they think about crime and criminals. Legislatures are free to 
decide that the same penalties ought to apply to intentional and non-
intentional behavior. But that decision should be made explicitly, and the 
statutory text should clearly inform voters about the decision that their 
representatives are making. 
In sum, we set the default standard at knowing because knowledge is a 
simpler mental state to apply and because we believe—in keeping with the 
anti-punitive values underlying criminal clear statement rules—that the 
default standard should err on the side of greater culpability rather than less. 
We acknowledge that the choice of this particular default mental state may 
be controversial. But, even if one thinks that recklessness is the appropriate 
default mental state, as opposed to knowledge, that should not lessen the 
force of our argument that courts should adopt a mens rea clear statement 
rule. 
B. Substantial Harm Clear Statement Rule 
Our second proposed clear statement rule targets overly broad statutes. 
Some statutes are written so broadly that they include both serious and 
trivial conduct. We propose that courts adopt a clear statement rule that 
excludes trivial conduct from felony liability absent a clear statement to the 
contrary. Specifically, we propose a clear statement rule that requires a 
defendant to have either caused or intended to cause substantial harm in 
order for her conduct to fall within the scope of a felony statute. Such a clear 
statement rule will force legislatures who wish to impose severe penalties 
for trivial conduct to say so clearly.  
Legislators (and their constituents) are willing to endure laws that 
include innocent behavior or trivial wrongdoing because they do not expect 
the laws to be fully enforced. They assume that law enforcement will use 
these laws only to target serious offenders—an idea that Josh Bowers calls 
 
a preference for a longer sentence. But the voter’s assumptions about the typical burglary are incorrect; 
most burglars are unarmed, have shorter criminal histories, and are less likely to harm a victim than the 
voter assumes. Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has 
Come (Again)?, 108 YALE. L.J. 1775, 1781 (1999). Put differently, when deciding how and whether to 
punish certain conduct, people tend to imagine the worst. See generally Kennedy, supra note 4. 
322. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY 
VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 94–97 (1995) (reporting results from empirical studies indicating that 












“equitable discretion.”323 But most defendants have no recourse when 
prosecutors fail to use their equitable discretion to prosecute only serious 
offenders.324 So long as defendants’ behavior falls within the text of the 
statute, prosecutors are free to charge and convict them. 
Legislatures have many incentives to pass such overly broad statutes. It 
is not just that precisely crafted laws require time and effort.325 Precise laws 
also make it easier for wrongdoers to escape liability through a 
“loophole.”326 And precise laws are more likely to be rendered obsolete by 
technology or other changes in circumstances. Broadly written laws are less 
likely to be circumvented or rendered obsolete. But they accomplish this by 
criminalizing more conduct than is necessary to achieve the legislature’s 
goal.327  
Bond v. United States328 provides a helpful illustration. Bond involved a 
prosecution under the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, 
which was enacted to fulfill the United States’ treaty obligations.329 But the 
statute defines “chemical weapon” very broadly.330 And so federal 
 
323. Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to 
Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1658 (2010). As Bowers explains, a prosecutor might decide not 
to charge a person because she is unsure that she has enough evidence to prove guilt, because she wishes 
to conserve resources for other cases, or because she decides that a particular defendant—though 
guilty—is not sufficiently blameworthy. Id. at 1657. It is this last type of decision—“whether defendants 
normatively ought to be charged”—that is an exercise of equitable discretion. Id. at 1658. 
324. As noted below, defendants in some jurisdictions are able to seek a dismissal under 
specialized statutes. See infra note 365 and accompanying text. And a small number of defendants have 
succeeded in convincing judges to label facially clear statutes as ambiguous—so that they could render 
a more narrow interpretation that excluded the defendants’ trivial conduct. See infra notes 342–344 and 
accompanying text. 
325. See supra note 36. 
326. See Buell, supra note 37. 
327. See Buell, supra note 37, at 1502–04 (providing an example of different iterations of a law 
banning pitbulls and other dogs in order to address strategic behavior by those who train and own 
aggressive and dangerous dogs). 
328. 572 U.S. 844 (2014). 
329. Id. at 848–49. The statute was enacted to implement the United Nations Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction. Id. at 844. The preamble of the Convention states that the “Parties to this Convention [are] 
[d]etermined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control, including the prohibition and elimination 
of all types of weapons of mass destruction.” Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. 
TREATY DOC. No. 103-21 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993).  
330. That statute forbids anyone from, inter alia, knowingly possessing or using “any chemical 
weapon.” 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012). It defines “chemical weapon” to include “toxic chemical[s]” 
which it defines as  
any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. The term includes all such chemicals, 
regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are 












prosecutors used the statute to convict Carol Anne Bond, who put two 
caustic chemicals (one of which she ordered on Amazon) on the car door, 
mailbox, and door knob of a woman who had an affair with her husband.331 
Although the two chemicals could be lethal at high doses, it was undisputed 
that Bond did not intend to kill her victim. “She instead hoped that [the 
victim] would . . . develop an uncomfortable rash.”332 Even this did not 
happen. Instead, the victim “suffered a minor chemical burn on her thumb, 
which she treated by rinsing with water.”333 Yet Bond was convicted under 
a statute that allowed a sentence of life imprisonment. 
This is a clear case of an overly broad law. Although Bond’s behavior 
fell within the text of the statute, it is highly unlikely that Congress was 
thinking of defendants like Bond when it enacted the Chemical Weapons 
Convention Implementation Act. Both the intended and actual injury in the 
Bond case were less than one would suffer from being pepper sprayed—and 
one can buy pepper spray at ordinary retailers, such as Walmart. No one 
would say that Bond used a weapon of mass destruction; she targeted a 
single individual, and her actions barely posed a threat to her particular 
victim. Indeed, when Bond appealed her conviction, the Third Circuit 
acknowledged that “[t]he Act’s breadth is certainly striking, seeing as it 
turns each kitchen cupboard and cleaning cabinet in America into a potential 
chemical weapons cache.” 334 But the court noted that “the Act’s wide net 
was cast ‘for obvious reasons,’” and so it upheld the conviction.335 The 
Supreme Court subsequently reversed on different grounds.336 
Broadly written statutes are hardly an isolated occurrence. In the past 
several years, the Supreme Court has heard several cases, including Bond, 
in which they were forced to grapple with the government’s decision to use 
broad laws to reach trivial behavior.337 For example, in Yates v. United 
States,338 the government prosecuted a fisherman under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 
for destroying or concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede” 
an investigation of a matter within the jurisdiction of a department or agency 
 
18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A), (8)(A). The statute specifically exempts “any individual self-defense device, 
including those using a pepper spray or chemical mace.” 18 U.S.C. § 229C. It also exempts chemicals 
that are intended for peaceful purposes, protective purposes, and unrelated military purposes. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 229F(7). 
331. Bond, 572 U.S. at 852. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. 
334. United States v. Bond, 681 F.3d 149, 154 n.7 (3d. Cir 2012), rev’d sub nom. Bond v. United 
States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014). 
335. Id. 
336. Bond, 572 U.S. at 866. 
337. See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Extremely Broad Laws, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) 
(manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3205783 (collecting cases). 












of the United States.339 Yates had caught some fish that were smaller than 
what was permitted under applicable fishing regulations and he ordered a 
crew member to dispose of the fish in order to prevent federal authorities 
from confirming that he had violated these regulations.340 Violating the 
regulations would have resulted in a fine.341 But section 1519—which was 
adopted to address corporate fraud in the wake of the Enron scandal—
carries a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison.  
The Court reversed the conviction in Yates. In order to do so, it had to 
first find the statute ambiguous. As Justice Kagan illustrated in a biting 
dissent, it is simply not credible for the Court to claim that the statute was 
ambiguous—a fish is obviously a “tangible object.” 342 Yates is not the only 
case where the courts have tried to deal with overly broad laws by claiming 
that clear text was ambiguous.343 For example, the Supreme Court 
overturned the conviction in Bond by claiming that the statutory language 
was unclear.344  
The modern embrace of textualism requires this sort of subterfuge. A 
court that has eschewed the practice of interpreting statutes according to the 
legislature’s purpose can hardly make judgements about whether a statute 
is written more broadly than necessary—what is necessary can only be 
determined by looking at what purpose the legislature was attempting to 
 
339. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012) (“Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers 
up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, 
obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of 
any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or 
contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both.”). 
340. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1078. 
341. Id. at 1079–80. The Court also noted that, in the time between the defendant’s actions and 
the government’s indictment, the relevant fishing regulations had changed. Id. 
342. Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1090–1101 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
343. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 337 (manuscript at 2). 
344. The chemicals that Bond used fell quite clearly within the statutory language. Bond v. United 
States, 572 U.S. 844, 867–74 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Nonetheless, the defendant 
in Bond ended up prevailing because the majority used a federalism presumption—requiring a “clear 
indication” that Congress meant to “intrude[] on the police power of the States”—to read the statute 
more narrowly. Id. at 857–58, 860 (majority opinion). Unfortunately, lower courts have not read Bond 
to actually require a federalism clear statement when faced with other criminal statutes. E.g., United 
States v. Walls, 784 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Looney, 606 F. App’x 744, 747 (5th 
Cir. 2015). And, even if courts were to faithfully apply this federalism clear statement rule to criminal 
laws, the rule is limited to federal criminal law. The clear statement rule does not protect defendants 
from overly broad state statutes. For example, Bond committed her crimes in Pennsylvania. 
Pennsylvania makes it a first degree felony to possess, manufacture, or use a weapon of mass destruction, 
and it defines “weapon of mass destruction” to include any “chemical element or compound which 
causes death or bodily harm.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2716(i)(5) (2002). In other words, overly broad 












achieve.345 As Yates, Bond, and similar cases illustrate,346 a statute that is 
overly broad can nonetheless be written quite clearly. Thus, we need to 
develop a rule that addresses overly broad laws based on their breadth.347 
A clear statement rule requiring a defendant to have caused or intended 
to cause substantial harm would do precisely that, and it would go a long 
way to counteracting some of the worst problems associated with overly 
broad statutes. In particular, such a clear statement rule would reduce the 
risk that defendants are disproportionately punished for their acts. 
Defendants would not have to rely on the equitable discretion of prosecutors 
to avoid charges for trivial violations of a criminal statute. A clear statement 
rule would ensure that each defendant charged with a serious crime could 
argue that she ought not be convicted because her wrongful conduct was 
trivial. That is because the clear statement rule, in effect, adds a new element 
to all felony statutes: that the defendant either caused or intended to cause 
substantial harm. Unless the statute includes clear language to the contrary, 
the prosecutor must prove this substantial harm element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.348 Prosecutors who know that they may have to prove 
such an element to a jury will be less likely to file charges in trivial cases.349 
A substantial harm clear statement rule would be more effective at 
dealing with overcriminalization cases like Bond than current doctrine. 
Textualism does not exclude Bond’s behavior from the statute because the 
chemicals she used fell within the extraordinarily broad definition of 
“chemical weapon”—that is, “any chemical” which “can cause death . . . 
regardless of their origin or of their method of production.”350 (The two 
chemicals that she used were essentially harmless as she employed them, 
but they could be lethal at much higher doses.) The rule of lenity could not 
help Bond because the statute does not seem to be ambiguous.351 The statute 
 
345. Cf. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998) (“[I]t is not, and cannot be, our practice 
to restrict the unqualified language of a statute to the particular evil that Congress was trying to remedy—
even assuming that it is possible to identify that evil from something other than the text of the statute 
itself.”). 
346. E.g., Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018) (construing statutory language 
“this title”—which referred to title 26 of the U.S. Code—to refer only to particular IRS proceedings in 
order to avoid turning any non-compliance with IRS rules into a felony). 
347. See generally Brennan-Marquez, supra note 337. 
348. Cf. HUSAK, supra note 6, at 370–86 (discussing the prohibition on punishing de minimis 
infractions of criminal law as both an element of an offense and a defense to conviction). That will 
permit defendants both before trial—in the form of a motion to dismiss the indictment, e.g., FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v) (“failure to state an offense”)—and at trial to argue that she neither intended nor 
caused substantial harm. 
349. Those prosecutors who do elect to charge trivial conduct run the risk of losing at trial, which 
gives them little leverage in plea bargaining. 
350. 18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A) (2012).  
351. To be sure, the Supreme Court stated that “the improbably broad reach of the key statutory 












defined the term “chemical weapon,” and so it was not subject to a 
vagueness challenge. The statute did not affect First Amendment activity, 
and so it was not subject to an overbreadth challenge. Bond was not subject 
to the death penalty nor was she a juvenile facing a life-without-parole 
sentence, and so she could not challenge her punishment as excessive under 
the Eighth Amendment.  
To be sure, legislatures could satisfy a substantial harm clear statement 
rule by stating that they intend a statute to apply to defendants no matter 
how little harm they caused or intended to cause. Indeed, one might imagine 
a world in which legislatures routinely included in statutes the phrase “a 
person need not intend or cause substantial harm to violate this statute.” But 
there are at least three reasons to believe that legislatures are unlikely to 
include such statements, as a matter of course, in legislation combatting 
serious crimes.  
First, an affirmative statement that legislation ought to be used in trivial 
situations undercuts any argument that the new statute is necessary to 
address substantial harms. As explained above, new criminal laws are often 
adopted when the threat of something or someone is greatly exaggerated.352 
Statutory language extending liability to trivial conduct is inconsistent with 
this moral panic narrative, and so the pressure to pass legislation will not 
extend to including language about trivial conduct.  
Our legislative dysfunction is driven, at least in part, by public opinion—
in particular a widely shared belief “that criminals are not receiving harsh 
enough punishment.”353 But this punitive public opinion is a result of several 
information deficits,354 including an information deficit about the common 
characteristics of crimes. In particular, voters assume that the typical crime 
is more serious than the average crime actually is. For example, one study 
documented that voters supported harsher sentences for burglary because 
they assumed that burglars are commonly armed and that a burglar is likely 
to inflict physical harm. But these assumptions about the typical burglary 
 
Court did not use the rule of lenity to resolve the case—instead, it used a clear statement rule. Id. That 
suggests the Court did not believe that the statute was ambiguous enough for lenity to apply.  
352. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
353. Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6 (2010); see 
also Bibas, supra note 44, at 927 (“In polls, the public says in the abstract that it thinks that judges 
sentence too leniently.”); Loretta J. Stalans & Arthur J. Lurigio, Lay and Professionals’ Beliefs About 
Crime and Criminal Sentencing: A Need for Theory, Perhaps Schema Theory, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
333, 344 (1990) (reporting that 72 percent of the lay subjects in the study said that judges are too lenient 
in sentencing burglary). 
354. Those information deficits include public misunderstanding about the crime rate and public 
perception about sentence lengths. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Mandatory Minimums and Popular 













are incorrect; most burglars are unarmed and are unlikely to harm a 
victim.355 
If legislators were forced to explicitly state that they intended harsh 
penalties to apply to defendants who neither intend nor cause serious harm, 
then they would not be able to rely on public misperceptions about crime 
characteristics. Take, for example, the Controlled Substances Act.356 The 
text of that statute criminalizes, among other behaviors, a person giving a 
prescription painkiller to her spouse who injures his back. Voters likely 
assume that this criminal statute targets commercial drug dealers. An 
explicit statement by the legislature that it intends to include trivial offenses 
would counterbalance the information deficit. It would tell voters that the 
harsh penalties would apply to less culpable defendants, rather than 
allowing voters to assume that the harsh penalties are needed to deal with 
more serious offenders. 
Second, such a statement would mean that legislators could not blame 
prosecutors for prosecutions of trivial conduct. As we noted above, 
legislators can escape accountability for overly broad laws by blaming 
prosecutors for cases involving trivial conduct.357 But if legislators include 
language that explicitly includes trivial conduct within the scope of the 
statute, they cannot say that trivial cases are the result of a failure of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
Third, such language would make it easier for opponents of the 
legislation to challenge the legislation. That is, if legislatures explicitly state 
that they are targeting trivial or insubstantial conduct for felony liability, 
then they may lose political support for their punitive policies. The idea that 
trivial violations of the law ought not be punished is deeply intuitive, and 
likely widely shared.358 If legislatures were to start explicitly targeting 
behavior that they were required to affirmatively label as “trivial” or “not 
substantial,” it is difficult to believe that they will face no pushback on such 
legislation. That pushback would likely result in a legislative compromise 
that made no mention of the amount of harm required to trigger the 
statute.359 And, if the statute did not explicitly include trivial harm, then the 
clear statement rule would require a more narrow interpretation so that the 
statute included only substantial harm. 
 
355. Lanni, supra note 321, at 1781–82. 
356. See 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (2012) (prohibiting the use of Schedule II drugs without a 
prescription). 
357. See Stuntz, supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
358. See HUSAK, supra note 6, at 362–89. 
359. Ambiguity is a common method for obtaining legislative compromise. See generally Joseph 
A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity 












There is historical support for our substantial harm clear statement rule. 
A requirement of substantial harm has deep roots in the common law maxim 
de minimis non curat lex, which translates roughly to “the law does not 
concern itself with trifles.”360 The maxim can be traced back to Roman 
law,361 and it appears in the major English and early American treatises.362 
It applies not only in civil cases, but also in criminal cases,363 though with 
some limitations.364 And its influence can be seen today: approximately a 
third of states, as well as the Model Penal Code, have codified the ability of 
judges to dismiss criminal cases involving trivial wrongdoing.365 
Fittingly, de minimis non curat lex was often used as a rule of statutory 
construction.366 The maxim was most often used in civil cases. But it was 
also used to dismiss prosecutions against criminal defendants whose 
wrongdoing was minimal. For example, in State v. Goode, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court vacated an accessory’s conviction for receiving 
stolen goods after the fact.367 The defendant had received goods of little 
value, and the punishment for the principals had been minimal, and so the 
court relied on an old English case and the maxim de minimis non curat lex 
to vacate the conviction.368  
Similarly, in Rex v. Tindall,369 the defendants were indicted for creating 
a nuisance in a harbor by building a structure to protect their shipyard. 
Although building the structure fell within the text of the relevant statute, 
the jury rendered a special verdict in which it noted that the structure had 
 
360. De Minimis Non Curat Lex, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Anna 
Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REV. 327, 334–35 (2017); Max L. Veech & Charles R. Moon, 
De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 45 MICH. L. REV. 537, 538 (1947) (noting that the maxim has also been 
translated as “the law doth not regard trifles,” and arguing that this is the better translation). 
361. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 258 n.1 (1966); Veech & Moon, 
supra note 360, at 538. 
362. Veech & Moon, supra note 360, at 537, 539, 542–43. 
363. United States v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 194 F. 234, 250 (N.D. Ohio 1911) (“Criminal law, 
as well as civil, honors the maxim, ‘De minimis non curat lex,’ which has controlling application to the 
enforcement of a statute which aims at the repression of real and substantial abuses . . . .”); see also 1 
BISHOP, supra note 211, § 320 (labeling it “an old and familiar maxim, which, standing in the foremost 
rank of legal maxims, controls every department of our jurisprudence, civil and criminal”); Veech & 
Moon, supra note 360, at 542 (describing the maxim as “a rule of reason, a substantive rule that may be 
applied in all courts and to all types of issues” (footnote omitted)). 
364. 1 BISHOP, supra note 211, §§ 320–21 (noting limitations on the doctrine in cases involving 
larceny and arson). 
365. Roberts, supra note 360, at 332–37 (collecting and categorizing the relevant statutes and 
court rules). 
366. Veech & Moon, supra note 360, at 542. 
367. State v. Goode, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 463, 466 (1821). 
368. Id. at 464–66. In particular, the Goode Court relied on the case of Abraham Evans, which is 
discussed in MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN LAW 73–74 (3d ed. 1792). 












only a small effect on the rest of the harbor.370 The appellate court directed 
that a verdict of not guilty be entered against the shipyard owners because 
“no person can be made criminally responsible for consequences so slight, 
and uncertain, and rare.”371 
There is also modern precedent for our substantial harm rule. As Anna 
Roberts has documented, nineteen states have “given trial courts the power 
to dismiss prosecutions for the sake of justice.”372 Some states style this 
power as the power to dismiss “in furtherance of justice,” while others 
characterize it as the power to dismiss de minimis prosecutions.373 
Regardless of how it is phrased, these statutes permit judges to dismiss 
charges when the offense is insufficiently serious or did not cause sufficient 
harm. A de minimis provision also appears in the Model Penal Code.374 
Although these statutes have not received much attention,375 they appear to 
be uncontroversial. That may be because they are seen as a necessary safety 
valve to mitigate the excesses of the criminal justice system,376 or because 
we share the intuition that we should not impose the heavy costs association 
with a criminal conviction on those whose conduct is not seriously 
wrongful.377 It is precisely for these reasons—because the criminal justice 
system is too harsh and because it is unjust to punish trivial conduct—that 
courts should adopt the substantial harm clear statement rule. 
Some might object that our rule does not give any criteria for deciding 
what actual or intended harm is substantial and what is not. Whether harm 
was sufficiently serious will require a case-by-case determination based on 
individual facts. But the need for case-by-case determinations without 
clearly articulated criteria is hardly unique to our proposed rule. The law is 
 
370. Id. at 57. 
371. Id. at 58. 
372. Roberts, supra note 360, at 330. 
373. Id. 
374. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (“The Court shall dismiss a prosecution 
if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the 
attendant circumstances, it finds that the defendant’s conduct . . . did not actually cause or threaten the 
harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial 
to warrant the condemnation of conviction . . . .”). 
375. See HUSAK, supra note 6, at 362 (noting how little attention these laws have received); see 
also Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime, and the “De Minimis” Defense, 1997 
BYU L. REV. 51, 51–52; Roberts, supra note 360, at 330; Melissa Beth Valentine, Defense Categories 
and the (Category-Defying) De Minimis Defense, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 545, 545–46 (2017). 
376. See Roberts, supra note 360, at 339–46 (discussing how these provisions push back against 
the size and the harshness of the criminal justice system). 
377. See HUSAK, supra note 6, at 365 (stating that the statutes which are “literally over-inclusive, 
prohibiting a range of conduct broader than that which causes the harm or evil sought to be prevented,” 
can “create a powerful case for exculpation,” and that when a “defendant’s conduct did cause the harm 
or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, but did so” to a trivial extent, then liability 












replete with statutes requiring factfinders to make qualitative determinations 
about a defendant’s conduct or the consequences of that conduct.378 Asking 
a jury to decide whether harm is substantial is no different than asking them 
to determine whether something is reasonable or material.379 And, while 
flexible standards in the criminal law can create their own problems,380 a 
flexible standard is better than an obviously over-inclusive rule when it 
comes to criminal liability.381 
In any event, as a practical matter, our current system already relies 
heavily on determinations such as whether a defendant caused or intended 
to cause substantial harm. Prosecutors routinely make those determinations 
in deciding whether to use their equitable discretion not to prosecute. Our 
clear statement rule just reassigns those determinations to juries. If decisions 
not to enforce the law are going to be made on a case-by-case basis, juries 
ought to be making those decisions. Our constitutional structure inserts the 
jury as an additional check on the punitive tendencies of government 
actors.382 Asking juries to exercise the equitable discretion currently 
exercised by prosecutors will likely result in criminal prosecutions that more 
accurately reflect community norms about appropriate conduct.383 And it 
would give a legitimate outlet for jurors to reject prosecutorial choices other 
than through nullification. 
Some might object that juries would make these decisions arbitrarily. 
After all, jurors do not need to explain why they decided not to convict a 
 
378. See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 1a–99a, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 
2551 (2015) (No. 13-7120) (collecting federal criminal statutes and state criminal statutes that employ 
qualitative standards). 
379. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 512 (1995). 
380. See Hessick, supra note 1, at 992–1022; Hessick, supra note 15, at 1158–60. 
381. One might think that, as a general matter, rules are preferable to standards when it comes to 
the imposition of criminal liability. That is because a system of rules makes clear the threshold for 
liability before an individual acts, while standards only clarify the matter after the individual acts through 
adjudication. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 
560 (1992) (observing that “the only distinction between rules and standards is the extent to which efforts 
to give content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act”). In other words, rules provide 
more notice than standards, and notice is a bedrock principle of criminal justice. See Paul H. Robinson, 
Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 347–48 (2005). But 
that analysis holds true only insofar as the rule sets both the actual threshold for liability. Because overly 
broad laws are not always enforced as written, they give less notice than other bright-line rules. Cf. 
Hessick, supra note 1, at 998–99 (explaining how overly broad laws fail to give notice). 
382. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306–07 (2004). 
383. In this respect, the proposed clear statement rule is similar to various proposals aimed at 
incorporating more community input into the modern criminal justice system. See, e.g., Laura I. 
Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 741–48 (2010); Joshua Kleinfeld et. al., White Paper of 
Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (2017); Lanni, supra note 321; Richard 
E. Myers II, Requiring A Jury Vote of Censure to Convict, 88 N.C. L. REV. 137, 146–51 (2009); Jocelyn 













defendant, and they need not be consistent across cases because they sit only 
one case at a time. But that is not very different from the status quo: 
prosecutors are under no obligation to explain their decisions not to 
prosecute, and they are under no obligation to decline to enforce cases in a 
consistent fashion.384  
What is more, giving this power to juries does not completely remove it 
from prosecutors. Prosecutors will still have the power to decline to 
prosecute, and whether the defendant caused or intended to cause sufficient 
harm will continue to be one factor they consider. The proposed clear 
statement rule would only limit the power of prosecutors to bring charges 
in the absence of substantial harm. And it would install the jury as a new 
check on the prosecutor’s judgment whether the harm or intended harm in 
a particular case was significant enough to warrant a felony conviction.385 
In this way, the substantial harm clear statement rule provides substantially 
more protection of individual liberty than our current system of relying on 
prosecutorial discretion.386 
In sum, a substantial harm clear statement rule would mitigate one of the 
worst consequences of overly broad laws—the arbitrary and 
disproportionate punishment of trivial conduct. Such a rule is grounded in 
both history and modern practice. And, even if such a clear statement rule 
results in legislatures routinely enacting laws that include trivial conduct, at 
least it would require legislators to bear the political costs of imposing harsh 
penalties on those whose actions were not particularly harmful. 
CONCLUSION 
Clear statement rules are not a panacea for all that ails criminal justice. 
They are unlikely to have more than indirect effects on issues surrounding 
policing or racial inequality. Nor will they solve all of the legislative 
dysfunction that we and other observers have described. It is possible that a 
determinedly punitive legislature would amend its statutes to clearly 
describe the sweeping and harsh criminal liability that characterizes the 
status quo. To do so, however, they would have to take responsibility for 
their punitive choices. Clear statement rules will also not put an end to 
demagogic criticisms of “activist” judges. Judges who choose to adopt 
criminal clear statement rules are likely to face some scrutiny—especially 
when they adopt the rule for the first time.  
 
384. See Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 78 
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386. See Bowers, supra note 323, at 1704–23 (describing the “systemic pressures and institutional 
constraints” which cause prosecutors to “undervalue—or, at least, insufficiently act upon—equitable 











But clear statement rules are likely to be less controversial and more 
effective than the current doctrinal tools that courts use to intervene in 
substantive criminal law. And therefore, they are a promising path to at least 
some reduction in the harms caused by legislative dysfunction. 
Perhaps the greatest virtue of criminal clear statement rules is the 
simplicity of their rationale. “Say what you mean, and mean what you say” 
is a clear, sharp message that just might cut—or at least fray—the Gordian 
knot of contemporary legislative dysfunction about crime. 
